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Problem Description
The EU has set ambitious goals to reduce the CO2 emissions. An important
part of this is to increase the share of renewable sources in the energy mix,
in particular wind- and solar power. These are heavily weather dependent
causing intermittent generation. Consequently, challenges related to the
power balance develop.
Traditionally, most of the power that is traded at the power exchange Nord
Pool Spot is traded in the day-ahead market. Large variations in the produc-
tion will however increase the need for balancing services that are activated
closer to real time.
The increasing need for balancing services create a major business-opportunity
for Norwegian hydro power producers. Hydro power is flexible with the abil-
ity to mitigate the consequences from fluctuating renewable generation. The
objective of this work is to investigate the profitability a hydro power pro-
ducer may achieve by participating in the balancing and capacity market.
This is done by using a prototype optimization model for production plan-
ning in AMPL.
This Master’s thesis is a continuation of a specialization project that was
finished in December 2014. The thesis will be based on the same founda-
tion as the project and several improvements and model extensions will be
done. This includes improvement of input data and implementation of the
capacity market and a risk reducing strategy.
Supervisor: Magnus Korp˚as, NTNU
Co-supervisor: Marte Fodstad, SINTEF Energy Research
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Executive Summary
The main topic of this project has been to study the production scheduling
of a hydro power producer exposed to the day-ahead, balancing and capac-
ity market. The objective was to find what profit the producer may achieve
by strategically bid in the above mentioned markets.
A prototype model that undertakes this task has been developed by SINTEF
Energy Research as a part of their project ”Integrating Balancing Markets
in Hydro Power Scheduling Methods”. It is a multi-stage, multi-scenario,
short-term deterministic model programmed in AMPL. SINTEF Energy
Research and Statkraft have provided reservoir and inflow data. The water
values have been calculated using ProdRisk. Since the model is a prototype
which is under development, a substantial portion of the work has been
related to structure and implement proper input data such as PQ-curves,
inflow and price scenarios.
To examine the potential profit a producer may gain by participating in
the balancing market, the model has been run with and without the bal-
ancing market included in the simulation. The simulations have shown that
a hydro power producer increases the expected income by participating in
the balancing market. The key findings are summarized in the table below,
where the percentages are compared with the original income when bidding
in the day-ahead market only.
Increased income per day Week 1 Week 14 Week 27 Week 44
Absolute [kEUR] 20.72 20.22 7.74 9.00
As % of original income 5.24% 5.86% 0.65% 2.35%
The model has been run with both Nordic and German day-ahead prices.
The German day-ahead prices lead to even greater increase in profits when
including the balancing market, constituting 59.61% of the original income.
The simulations have also been done with higher price volatility, which re-
sulted in a further increase in profits.
Separate simulations have been done with different amounts of reserved
capacity in the capacity market, with measures to reduce risk and with
implementation to enforce acceptable reservoir behavior, respectively. The
possibility of gathering profits from the capacity market proved to be lim-
ited. However, this conclusion is based on the prices that have been seen
since the market was introduced in 2014 and may change if the prices rise.
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Sammendrag
Hovedtemaet for dette prosjektet har vært a˚ studere produksjonsplanleg-
gingen til en vannkraftprodusent som opererer i day-ahead-, balanse- og
kapasitetsmarkedet. Form˚alet var a˚ undersøke om en produsent kan øke
fortjenesten ved a˚ by strategisk i disse markedene.
En prototypemodell har blitt utviklet av SINTEF Energi som en del av pros-
jektet ”Integrating Balancing Markets in Hydro Power Scheduling Meth-
ods”. Modellen er en flersteg, multi-scenario, deterministisk korttidsmodell,
programmert i AMPL. Reservoar- og tilsigsdata har blitt gjort tilgjengelig
av SINTEF Energi AS og Statkraft. Vannverdiene ble beregnet i ProdRisk.
En konsekvens av at modellen er under utvikling er at en stor mengde ar-
beid har vært knyttet til a˚ tilpasse og implementere input data, som blant
annet PQ-kurver, tilsig og prisscenarier.
Det ble foretatt simuleringer med og uten regulerkraftmarkedet inkludert for
a˚ undersøke hvor mye lønnsomheten potensielt kan økes ved a˚ delta i dette
markedet. Simuleringene viste at den forventede inntekten økte dersom
produsenten deltok i regulerkraftmarkedet. Hovedfunnene er oppsummert
i tabellen nedenfor. Verdiene oppgitt i prosent er sammenlignet med den
forventede inntekten ved kun a˚ delta i spotmarkedet.
Increased income per day Week 1 Week 14 Week 27 Week 44
Absolute [kEUR] 20.72 20.22 7.74 9.00
As % of original income 5.24% 5.86% 0.65% 2.35%
Simuleringer ble gjort med b˚ade nordiske og tyske priser. Med tyske priser
økte den forventede inntekten desto mer da regulerkraftmarkedet ble inklud-
ert. Økningen utgjorde 59.61% av inntekten ved kun a˚ delta i spotmarkedet.
Simuleringer ble ogs˚a utført med økning i prisvolatilitet, noe som førte til
at den forventede inntekten økte ytterligere.
Kapasitetsmarkedet har blitt implementert i modellen der simuleringer med
ulike mengder allokert kapasitet er utført. Muligheten for a˚ øke profitten
ved a˚ delta i dette markedet viste seg a˚ være lav. Siden kapasitetsmarkedet
ble introdusert i 2014, er denne konklusjonen basert p˚a priser fra sesongen
2014/2015. Det er mulig det vil lønne seg i fremtiden dersom prisene for
reservert kapasitet endrer seg.
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1 Introduction
Hydro power plays an important role in a power system focusing on mitiga-
tion and adaption to climate change. The penetration of renewable energy
sources like wind and solar has increased significantly in Europe through-
out the last years. These energy sources are heavily weather dependent
causing intermittent generation. Consequently, challenges related to the
power balance develop. Norwegian hydro power is flexible with the ability
to mitigate the consequences from fluctuating renewable generation. The
increasing need for balancing services create a major business-opportunity
for Norwegian hydro power producers.
The objective of this work is to investigate the profitability a hydro power
producer may achieve by participating in several short-term markets, em-
phasizing the balancing market. This will be done using a prototype pro-
duction planning model programmed in A Mathematical Programming Lan-
guage (AMPL), provided by SINTEF Energy Research. It is a multi-stage,
multi-scenario deterministic model that describes a single hydro power pro-
ducer bidding in the day-ahead and balancing market.
A consequence of the model being under development is that the proce-
dure of finding and implementing input data is not given and input data
has to be adjusted to the appropriate format. Thus, in-depth work will be
performed to generate proper input data from a realistic case into the model.
It is important to be critical to the results as the model has extensive sim-
plifications of real-world conditions and may not take all relevant factors
into account when calculating the optimal solution. Based on the results,
strengths and weaknesses with the model will therefore be evaluated.
Structurally, the project thesis is composed of three main parts: A lit-
erature review, model representation and optimization results. Section 2
represents a theoretical background of the relevant themes for the optimiza-
tion problem such as today’s power market, the changing energy sector and
hydro power methodologies. Section 3 describes the functionality of the
optimization model, while the specific case study that will be examined will
be described in section 5, including the work related to input data. Section
6 and 7 covers results and analysis of the case, respectively.
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2 Methodologies and Background
2.1 The Nordic Power System
This section focuses on the Nordic power system. The Nordic countries
are interconnected with the Baltic countries Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia,
creating the Nordic-Baltic power system. These countries are synchronized
and the power system is connected with continental Europe through HVDC-
cables.
The Nordic power system is dominated by hydro- and thermal power pro-
duction, with an increasing amount of wind power. As figure 1 illustrates,
the countries have different production mix. The different energy resources
complement each other. E.g. Norway export power in wet years and import
in dry years, while Denmark export when there are a lot of wind and import
when it is less windy. Hydro power constitutes more than half of the total
Nordic power production. Furthermore, 60 per cent of the Norwegian and
Swedish hydro power is reservoir hydro. Thus, the Nordic power system in
total has high flexibility as a result of the large amount of hydro power [1].
Figure 1: Total power production and production mix in the Nordic coun-
tries in 2012 [1].
The characteristics of hydro power make it desirable to participate in the
balancing market. These characteristics include short response times, abil-
ity to black start, cost-efficient flexibility and energy storage potential [3].
With these characteristics hydro power can enhance stability and security of
2
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supply, hence facilitate the integration of intermittent renewable energy by
participating at the balancing market. Hydro power is expected to play an
increasingly important role in the future as the power system is changing.
This will be further discussed in the following section.
2.2 The Changing European Power Sector
It is expected that the European power market is going to change remark-
ably the coming years as a result of climate concerns and market efficiency
promotion. The next sections will look into the two main European power
market trends: increased market coupling and renewable energy penetra-
tion. Subsequently, the impact on Norwegian hydro power producers will
be discussed.
2.2.1 Renewable Energy Penetration
The European Union’s (EU) ambitious climate and energy policy has been
dominant throughout the last decade. The climate and energy target is ’20-
20-20’, i.e. achieving 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions, 20%
improvement in the EU energy efficiency and raising the renewable resource
share to 20% of the total EU power generation within 2020 [4]. Figure 2
illustrates the expected change in the European generation mix.
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Figure 2: Total installed production capacity in Europe in 2010 and ex-
pected in 2020 and the distribution between different technologies [1].
As the figures illustrate, the renewable energy share is predicted to increase
substantially. Furthermore, EU has a goal of reducing the greenhouse gas
emissions with 80 per cent within 2050. Investments in wind and solar
energy are expected to contribute considerably to achieve these goals [1].
These energy resources are weather dependent and can not be regulated to
meet demand of a power system. Thus, issues related to maintaining the
grid power balance are likely to occur.
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2.2.2 Market Coupling
EU has a goal of moving towards one common interconnected power system
in order to deal with intermittency issues posed by renewable generation,
enable diversity of suppliers and enable competition in the European market
[5]. Thus, a common European power system enhances liquidity, efficiency
and maximization of total social surplus. The transmission capacity from
the Northern Europe is expected to increase with 5000-6000MW by 2030
[1]. Figure 3 illustrates the projected capacity development from the syn-
chronous area within year 2020.
Figure 3: Expected interconnectors from the synchronous area in 2020 [1].
As of today, the integrated European day-ahead markets consist of 19 coun-
tries, covering 85% of the European power consumption [6]. Even though
the existing market integration is well advanced in day-ahead markets, it
is necessary to harmonize regional rules and market platforms further to
converge the markets and thus achieve a common EU approach [7].
2.2.3 A Need for Generation Flexibility
The high penetration levels of intermittent renewable energy combined with
a greater level of interconnectors will change the properties of the existing
power system. Firstly, issues related to maintaining the power balance in-
crease the demand for flexible power production with the ability to up- and
down-regulate rapidly.
5
2 METHODOLOGIES AND BACKGROUND
”To incorporate these intermittent sources, a power market needs to
be flexible enough to accommodate short-term forecasts and quick turn
transactions. This flexibility is particularly valuable with respect to wind
energy, where wind forecast uncertainty decreases from 15% to 4% in the
last 24 hours before actual generation (from observed data in Germany).
Therefore, intraday and balancing markets need to be adjusted to make full
use of the flexibility of the transmission system and the different generation
technologies to effectively respond to increased uncertainty.” [8]
Secondly, more cross-border transmission capacity enables the TSOs to co-
operate with the power exchange companies to establish a common intra-day
market. This gives the participants the opportunity to deal with the uncer-
tainty related to power generation. The technological differences between
the Nordic and European power system create dissimilarities in the cost of
balancing services. Thus, trade of balancing services is likely to be more
profitable in the future. The European energy trends create great business
opportunities to Norwegian hydro power producers, as the energy source
has low costs with high regulating abilities.
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2.3 The Nord Pool Market
This section presents the various power markets disposable for Norwegian
participants with emphasis on the regulating market. It is only the physical
market solutions offered at Nord Pool Spot that is described, as the financial
market is considered to be outside the scope of work in this project. The
physical market consists of a day-ahead-, intra-day- and balancing energy
market. In addition, the market contains a capacity market. These will
be referred to as DA, ID, BM and RKOM, respectively. These will be
briefly described in the following sub-sections. The information about these
markets are provided by [1] and [9].
Figure 4: An illustration of the financial- and physical market in Norway.
2.3.1 The Day-Ahead Market
The day-ahead spot market, Elspot, is the dominant market where most
of the trading occurs. Elspot functions as an auction where producers and
consumers send their hourly purchase and sale bids before noon the day
ahead. When the market closes, Nord Pool Spot arrange the bids into
supply and demand bid curves for each hour and the market prices are
decided by the intersection between the two curves, as illustrated in figure 5.
All participants will receive this market price, regardless of their submitted
bids, and they are obligated to deliver/purchase their volume commitments
the next day. The obligated volume is set by interpolating between the
nearest price-volume bids.
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Figure 5: An illustration of the energy market bid curves.
Due to bottlenecks, the Nordic countries are divided into 15 bidding areas
that may have different area prices depending on the demand, supply and
transmission capacity. In 2013, 493 TWh was traded through Nord Pool
Spot. This represented 84% of the total power exchange.
2.3.2 The Intra-Day Market
When the DA has cleared at 12:00 CET and the market prices for the next
day has been calculated, the intra-day market Elbas opens at 14:00 CET
covering the Nordic and Baltic region as well as Germany.
Elbas is a continuous market that supplements Elspot and contributes to
secure the power balance. Imbalance between demand and supply may oc-
cur after the market clearing because of unforeseen endeavors such as power
plant shut down or deviation from weather forecasts. This might cause more
or less power production than expected. By trading at Elbas, the market
participants are allowed to adjust their bids until one hour before real time
in order to create the necessary balance between supply and demand. In
2013, 4.2 TWh was traded on Elbas. This constituted 0.85% of the total
power traded on Nord Pool Spot that year.
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2.3.3 The Balancing Market
When the ID has closed one hour before operation time, the TSOs have the
responsibility to maintain the power balance at instantaneous production
in their respective area. Since the TSO does not have production resources
of its own, it has to acquire balancing services in terms of reserve capacity
and balancing energy. In the following paragraphs the Norwegian balancing
market will be emphasized.
The balancing market consists of three main control principles: primary-,
secondary-, and tertiary regulation reserves. The goal is to maintain the
system frequency at 50Hz in the Nordic synchronous system. Both primary
and secondary reserves are automatically activated, while tertiary reserve is
manually activated by the TSO. The secondary reserves is used to restore
primary control if the imbalance lasts for minutes, and the tertiary reserve
is a backup to the secondary reserve if the frequency deviation still exists.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Illustration of activation sequence of different types of reserves
[1].
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When the balancing market is discussed in this report, it is the tertiary
reserve that it is referred to. A common Nordic balancing market was in-
troduced in 2002 as a result of collaboration between Nordic TSOs. In this
market, balancing services can be used to handle imbalances anywhere in
the Nordic power system, given that the transmission capacity is sufficient.
The main participators that offer balancing resources are producers and
large consumers that are able to manually respond on 15 minutes notice
and deliver steady power for a minimum of one hour. The participants bid
price and volume that will be activated based on price in merit-order. The
market price is determined after the delivery hour, based on all bids that
are activated.
The Nordic regulating marked had a total volume of 1.66 TWh traded
in year 2013, which represented 0.34 per cent of the Elspot volume [10].
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the changing power system creates business
opportunities to hydro power producers.
2.3.4 The Capacity Market (RKOM)
There is a capacity market within the Norwegian balancing market that
ensures adequate up-regulation resources by using options. The need for
reserve capacity has mainly been related to the winter months (October
to April). This market is better known as Regulerkraftopsjonsmarkedet
(RKOM) within the country. Participants are paid to guarantee that they
participate in the balancing market if required with power production or
consumption disconnection. The options traded in RKOM last for a week
or a season, and the sets of conditions are equal in both these markets [11].
Capacity can be reserved in RKOM either on a seasonal or weekly ba-
sis. Capacities traded in RKOM-season are reserved for the entire season,
while there are two different types of RKOM-week options: RKOM-H and
RKOM-B. These are split into RKOM-day (00:00 to 05:00) and RKOM-
night (05:00 to 24:00). In RKOM-H bids are accepted for the entire day or
the entire night. Offers in RKOM-B can be limited in duration and include
a period of up to 8 hours with no reserved capacity. The RKOM-B bid price
is reduced for increasing flexibility according to rules applied by Statnett.
The deadline for bids in RKOM-week is Friday at noon for the following
week, Monday through Sunday. Available market data for RKOM-week can
be found in Appendix D.
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2.4 Hydro Power Scheduling
The theory presented is this section puts the optimization model of the pa-
per in context with the hydro power scheduling hierarchy. The information
is based on lectures and literature from [2].
The objective for a hydro power producer is to maximize profits in a dereg-
ulated market where the prices are unknown. The production scheduling
is a challenging task because the physical structures are complex, there
are large variations in resource availability and the time horizons are long.
In addition, the uncertainty related to price, inflow and demand make the
scheduling even more complicated. Therefore, the hydro power scheduling
problem is divided into a scheduling hierarchy consisting of long-term, sea-
sonal and short-term scheduling, see Figure 7. This report will focus on
the short-term scheduling. The scheduling and coupling methods in the
hierarchy will be described in the following sub-sections.
Figure 7: Scheduling hierarchy [2].
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2.4.1 Long-Term Scheduling
The long-term scheduling is typically done in the EFI’s Multi-Area Power-
market Simulator (EMPS) model. The objective is to ensure optimal uti-
lization of the resources in order to maximize profits. The inflow, renewable
generation, demand and other relevant factors are modelled as stochastic
parameters. This way the model takes many possible scenarios into account,
including the effect of extreme events with low probability but comprehen-
sive consequences.
The long-term model is divided into two phases; strategy phase and a sim-
ulation phase. In the former phase the water values are calculated for ag-
gregated local sub areas. The division of areas is based on the hydrological
characteristics, transmission constraints, ownership considerations and the
total river system. The second phase simulates a detailed dispatch of the
system up to 10 years ahead with weekly time resolutions. The water bal-
ance between the reservoirs is used to give end reservoir restrictions to the
seasonal modeling.
2.4.2 Seasonal Scheduling
The objective for the seasonal model is to maximize revenues from each
water system formulated as a deterministic problem. The seasonal schedul-
ing couples long-term with short-term scheduling, as these models require
different levels of details. The seasonal scheduling is based on the reservoir
drawdown model where the total production from each aggregated area
is distributed between available reservoirs and plants. Physical and judi-
cial constraints are implemented, giving a more detailed description of the
reservoirs. This makes it possible to calculate water values for each reservoir
within one year horizon and a weekly time step. The long-term modeling is
linked either at the autumn in the filling season, or at the end of the winter
before the snow starts melting. The choice of coupling method depends on
the degree of regulation of the reservoirs.
2.4.3 Short-Term Scheduling
Short-term optimization has the goal of finding the actual operation for
the coming days and hours. The optimal production is achieved when the
marginal cost of producing one more unit of energy equals the market price,
in EUR/MWh [12]. The mathematical formulation below illustrates a sim-
plified version of the maximization criterion, where the short-term profit
and the expected future value of the water left in the reservoir are added
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together. The underlying assumption is that there is perfect competition,
thus the market participants are price-takers.
Max[
∑
t∈T
(pt ∗ (qst − qpt)− cstart,t − cpenatly,t) +WT ] (1)
T - Number of time-steps
pt - Price at time step t [EUR/MWh]
qst - Quantity sold at time step t [MWh]
qpt - Quantity purchased at time step t [MWh]
cstart,t - Start-up costs for starting a unit at time step t [EUR].
Including a binary variable representing on/off
WT - Final end- reservoir value at time t=T [m3]
2.4.4 Water Values and Coupling
When determining the optimal hydro power production, it is essential to
consider the handling of reservoir level as equation 1 states. The value
of the water stored in the reservoir is seen as an opportunity cost, and is
defined as the expected value of the stored kWh of water [13]. It is an
expected value because the value is dependent on uncertain factors such as
future market prices, demand and inflow.
The water value of the unused water left in each reservoir at the end of
the model horizon depends on the water level in all other reservoirs. This
means that the water value for a reservoir is not a linear function, but a
multidimensional problem. It is very difficult to formulate an accurate func-
tion describing this and even if it was done, the non-linearities would make
it very hard to solve.
To work around this, water value cuts can be calculated from a sample
of reservoir levels in the respective magazines. Each sample contains a set
of reservoir levels, the corresponding water value and slope of the water
value of each reservoir. The slope indicates how much the value will change
per unit increase in the reservoir level. By using these cuts as restrictions
for the water value, the problem becomes linear with an acceptably low
inaccuracy.
It is intuitively clear that the water value function is a concave and in-
creasing function. It is increasing because more water in a reservoir never
will reduce future income. It is concave because an extra unit of water in
the reservoir will have less marginal value the fuller the reservoir is.
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2.5 Modelling Uncertainty
When performing hydro power scheduling, the two most important points
of uncertainty are the market prices and the inflow.
2.5.1 Prices
A critical uncertainty to power producers is related to the market prices
of electricity, as the clearing prices in both the DA and BM are unknown
at the time of bidding. Furthermore, the market prices are expected to be
influenced by the change in the European power system (see section 2.2).
It is important to investigate the price affections in order to mitigate the
price unpredictability, even though some uncertainty will remain.
To determine how a hydro power producer should utilize the balancing
markets efficiently with the introduction of more intermittent generation,
it is important to make reasonable assumptions on how such generations
will affect the market prices. Since intermittent power cannot be stored
efficiently with today’s technology, it has to be produced whenever the re-
source is available, e.g. when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. An
intermittent power producer is therefore dependent on an accurate forecast
of the weather for the next day to be able to estimate the power he will be
able to deliver. If the forecast then turns out to be wrong, the producer
has to trade in the intra-day or balancing market. As a consequence, it is
reasonable to assume that a larger share of intermittent power generation
will cause the balancing market price to have higher volatility and deviate
more from the spot price.
When generating future price scenarios, several factors have to be analyzed
in order to generate realistic prices. Some of the most important global
drivers are affected by numerous external forecasts. According to Statkraft
[14], a reasonable way to generate price scenarios is by gather and analyze
information from a large set of well-known sources such as IEA, EU and
IPCC. This information combined with well-thought assumptions is used to
formulate estimates of critical global drivers such as fuel prices, CO2 prices
and policies, technology costs and the macroeconomic situation. One must
accept that unforeseen market events may occur, and it can be hard to in-
corporate the outcome of them. There will always be uncertainty related to
the forecast as the future is unknown. However, it is important to make as
reasonable assessments as possible to investigate realistic future profitability
of hydro power.
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2.5.2 Inflow
When undertaking long term and seasonal scheduling, accurate predictions
of the inflow to the reservoirs are important for good results. To be able to
find an optimal solution of how much water to take out of the reservoirs,
one needs to know how much runs into them. In short term scheduling,
however, the inflow plays a very minor role if the reservoir is large. The
inflow during one day is typically a lot smaller than the reservoir capacity.
As a consequence, a normal inflow will not lead to a significant increase in
the reservoir level in the cause of just one day, and therefore not affect the
optimal dispatch notably. An exception is during extreme flooding, when
small reservoirs in particular might produce or even spill more than other-
wise optimal.
The inflow is in general more important for smaller reservoirs, since the
inflow will be larger compared to the capacity. In this case, the producer
will have less freedom to make decisions based on the market, but be more
confined to physical restrictions. In run-of-river plants the producer can
only produce when there is inflow.
Since hydro power has a dominant position in the Nordic market, the prices
are strongly correlated with the inflow [2]. The prices will therefore to some
extent reflect the expected future inflow, which is more important than the
actual inflow for the particular day of scheduling.
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2.6 Software Tools
The optimization model of the river system is implemented in the commer-
cial software A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL). The alge-
braic modeling language is capable to describe and solve high-complexity
optimization problems and schedule-type problems. The problems sup-
ported by AMPL include linear, nonlinear, mixed-integer and constraint
programming. An important advantage with AMPL is the syntax simi-
larity between the modelling language and the mathematical notation of
optimization problems. The optimization software package CPLEX is used
to solve the optimization problems. It is the most widely used large-scale
solver because of its efficiency and robustness [15].
ProdRisk [16] is a software tool that is utilized for the calculation of in-
put data in the model. The model developed by SINTEF is used for long-
and mid-term hydropower optimization and simulation. The calculation is
based on stochastic dual dynamic programming. The results from ProdRisk
simulations are utilized as water value cuts that create consistency between
inflow- and price scenarios generated in the long-term scheduling. Further
explanations about the concept of seasonal scheduling and water value cuts
are found in Section 2.4.2 and 2.4.4. The generated values are used as input
data in the model implemented in AMPL.
Matlab is another software tool that has been utilized to generate and ana-
lyze input data related to the considered system. It is a high-level program-
ming language that is used mostly for numerical computation and visual-
ization [17]. The processed data has been used as decision support when
evaluating the results, and relevant values have been implemented as input
data in both AMPL and ProdRisk.
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To examine the role of the regulating power market today and in the fu-
ture, a multi-stage, multi-scenario, short-term deterministic model is used.
The optimization problem has been implemented and solved in AMPL. The
model is developed as a part of the SINTEF project ’Integrating Balanc-
ing Markets in Hydro Power Scheduling Methods’ and is written by Marte
Fodstad and Arild Helseth. The model description in this section is based
on [18] and [10].
The model is still to be considered a prototype and is under development
as this report is written. The model is not yet integrated with other com-
mercial software, which means that data gathered from some sources has to
be modified to fit the input format. The modifications made will be further
discussed in Section 5.2.
It considers a power producer who bids into the DA and BM. Based on
scenarios of different reservoir inflows and market prices, the model opti-
mizes the utilization of a hydro power system in order to maximize the sum
of the profit within the model horizon and the future value of the unused
water. One day is modeled at the time. The day is split into discrete time
periods, the length of which is decided in the input data. The model docu-
mentation assumes an hourly resolution (24 time periods per day), but any
resolution could be chosen.
The model does not take transmission costs into account and long-term
commitments are considered fixed. This means that the uncertainty in this
model is related to reservoir inflow and market prices only.
The functionality of the model is described in the following sections. The
full mathematical model description can be found in Appendix A, where
equations referred to can be found.
3.1 Overview
A hydro power plant consists of a reservoir, a number of generators and no
more than one pump. The set R contains all the reservoirs and the gen-
erators connected to reservoir r ∈ R are gathered in the set Gr. The set
G = ∪r∈RGr is the combined set of all generators across all reservoirs.
The water flows and levels (except the inflows, which are parameters) are de-
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cision variables and are denoted q. The superscript of these indicates which
kind of flow they represent: V is the reservoir level, R denotes released wa-
ter from the reservoir, D discharge through the generator, B bypass and S
spillage.
Figure 8: A hydro power unit with a reservoir, two generators and a
pump. Solid lines are flows (decision variables) and spotted lines are input
parameters [10].
3.2 Objective
The objective of the optimization is to maximize total profits. The income
is the sum of the future value of the unused water (A.4), the value of the
spinning state relative to the original state (A.5) and the income from the
day-ahead and balancing markets (A.6 and A.7). The spillage cost (A.1),
the startup cost (A.2) and the operation cost of thermal generation (A.3)
are subtracted.
3.3 Stages
The optimization is done in three stages. The first stage is to bid in the
DA. In the second stage, the DA is cleared and bids are accepted to the
BM. In the last stage, the BM is cleared, imbalance settled and the optimal
physical dispatch is found. Non-anticipativity constraints are added so that
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scenarios linked to the same node at a stage must have the same solution
in this stage.
3.4 Water-to-Energy Calculations
The accurate function describing the generated electric of a hydro power
generator is:
w = 9.81 · 10−3ETurb(h(q), qD)EGenqDh(q) (2)
ETurb and EGen are turbine and generator efficiencies, qD is the discharged
water flowing through the turbine, q represents all flows and reservoir lev-
els in play and h(q) is the head function, including height difference and
friction losses. This equation is complex and non-linear and some assump-
tions are made to simplify. Since the model horizon typically is one day,
the head is considered constant. It is also assumed that each generator is
independent, which means that they do not share tunnels or penstocks. The
generated power is then modelled as a concave, piecewise linear function of
the discharge. This linear curve is referred to as the PQ-curve. Section 5.2.2
describes the concept of PQ-curves further.
3.5 Water Value Implementation
The water value calculations are implemented in the model by using so
called cuts. Every cut consist of a set of reservoir level, the total value
of the water in all the reservoirs combined and the marginal water value
in each reservoir. The marginal water value indicates how much the total
water value will change per unit increase in the reservoir level. This way
the model takes into account the fact that the water value in each reservoir
is dependent on each other. Further description of water values is found in
Section 2.4.4.
Since larger reservoirs will dominate the total water value, only the change
in water value from the first to the last time period is added to the objective
function. I.e. the water value of the initial conditions, U0, is subtracted
from the water value at the end of the planning horizon. U0 is calculated
before the simulation. Equation A.10 shows the mathematical formulation
of the water value cuts.
3.6 Reservoir Balances, Ramping and Discharge Rates
The water balance in each reservoir is described by Equation A.8. It simply
states that the volume in the reservoir after a time period is equal to the
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volume at the start of the period plus the sum of all flows into and out of
the reservoir during the period. Equation A.9 describes the mass balance
between the reservoir and the generator. It states that the total discharge
runnig through the generators has to equal the sum of the released water
from the reservoir and the unregulated inflow, minus the water that does
not flow through the generators (the bypass).
There are limits to the ramping rates of each reservoir, i.e. how fast the
volume of the reservoir is allowed to change. These limits are given as a
fraction of the total reservoir capacity per hour. The ramping of the reser-
voir should ideally restrict the changes in the water surface height above sea
level, which is not necessarily proportional to the volume. To simplify the
implementation, the values used are therefore approximations to the change
in water surface level with respect to reservoir volume. There are similar
limits for the ramping of discharge, given in m3 per hour. The reservoir and
discharge ramping rates are implemented in the model through Equation
A.12 and A.13, respectively.
3.7 Cost of Spillage
The cost of spilling water is normally only the lost value of the water not
flowing through the turbine. Large spillages may however cause damage
that the producer will have to pay for. The cost of this damage is denoted
cSpillrts and is assumed to be a linear function of the amount of spilled water
above the lower limit Q
S
r . The rate of the cost per amount of spilled water
is denoted CSpillr .
3.8 Start up Cost
Although the start up costs of a hydro power generator is normally small, it
should be taken into account to ensure accurate distribution of production.
The start up cost is denoted CStartg and is added to the objective function
every time a generator is started through equation A.24.
3.9 Time Lag
The water that flows out of the reservoirs may end up in a downstream
reservoir at some later time. The sets RDr , RSr and RBr contains the reser-
voirs who’s discharge, spillage and bypass, respectively, flows into reservoir
r. The time the water spends flowing from one reservoir to another is cap-
tured by sets T Drˆt , T Srˆt and T Brˆt . An element in e.g. T Drˆt will be the time
20
3.10 Markets
period t when discharge from reservoir rˆ that was released in time period
tˆ ends up in the downstream reservoir. The time it takes for the water to
travel from an upstream to a downstream reservoir is TD,Lagrˆ . T
L is the
length of each time period. The equation used to calculate TD,Lagrˆ is:
T Brˆt = {tˆ ∈ T : t− 1 < tˆ−
1
2
+
TD,Lagrˆ
TL
≤ t} (3)
3.10 Markets
The power markets are handled according to the rules of Nord Pool Spot,
see Section 2.3.
The Day Ahead Market
The bid curves are constructed by a number of price/volume-pairs and linear
between these points. While the producer in reality is allowed to decide both
price and volume, the prices are pre-determined in the input data, and the
model only decides on the volumes. The volumes allocated in the DA are
described by A.26 (delivery) and A.27 (purchase). Equations A.28 and A.29
ensure bid curve monotony.
The Balancing Market
The BM is treated in the same way as the DA, with the exception that
the bid curves are sets of discrete price points. This means that each bid
is either entirely accepted or rejected. The volumes allocated in the BM
are described by A.30 (delivery) and A.31 (purchase). Equations A.32 and
A.33 ensure bid curve monotony.
3.11 Notes
Some hydro power plants include pumps and the model is designed to be
able to handle this. There are however no pumps in the system that is being
examined here, and the functionality connected to pumps are therefore not
described. Some additional market functionality has also been disabled to
reduce complexity. This includes e.g. fixed production delivery (mandatory
production) and purchase in the DA.
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3.12 Model Assumptions
There are mainly two assumptions in the model that one should be aware of.
Firstly, the model assumes that the producer is a price taker. This means
that there are no interactions between the producer and the market and
the producer decisions do not affect the market price in any of the markets.
This is a reasonable assumption for a small producer relative to the total
production in the area.
The power system that will be examined in this thesis is Tokke-Vinje, see
Section 5, which is a rather large system. The total capacity is 990.4 MW,
which means that the potential production is almost 24 GWh per day. The
system produce power in the NO2-area, which in 2014 had an average daily
production of 138.7 GWh. The peak during the winter 2014/2015 was close
to 210 GWh per day [19]. This means that the Tokke-Vinje system can
produce around 17% of the total supplied power on an average day and
11% during peaks.
No data on historical production for the isolated Tokke-Vinje system was
available. Hence, it is not possible to accurately verify whether or not the re-
sults in this thesis deviate from a realistic production plan. It was therefore
not possible to evaluate the results with respect to the price taker assump-
tion.
The second assumption that is made is that the producer is risk neutral.
The producer will act based on expected revenues regardless of the risk in-
volved. In real life, the producer will weigh the expected revenues against
the possibility of reducing the risk of ending up in situations with con-
siderably worse results. This risk will vary depending on input data. An
alternative way to handle risk will therefore be examined in Section 4.3.
22
4 Model Modifications
The model has been improved by adding new features to the implementa-
tion. This section describes the weaknesses with the model and the imple-
mentations that will strengthen them.
4.1 Implementation of RKOM
The RKOM is a capacity market that is cleared before the period of plan-
ning starts. The data from Statnett in Appendix D shows that there is
currently no RKOM trade for the night hours, thus the capacity will be re-
served in RKOM-day only. See Section 2.3.4 for explanation of the RKOM.
All capacities are reserved in the RKOM-H. The RKOM-B allows more
flexibility, but at a lower price. To utilize the flexibility one would need to
let the model decide the optimal way to reserve capacity throughout the
hours, within the rules of RKOM-B and with different price levels as input.
This would have required extensive implementation work and could increase
computational time significantly. The RKOM-B was therefore excluded in
this thesis.
As only RKOM-H was implemented in the model, the reserved capacity
in the RKOM was determined beforehand as an input parameter. The mar-
ket was implemented as two restrictions based on this capacity, which are
shown in Equation 4 and 5. The regulation capacity, XRKOMt , measured
in MW/h, is reserved in the DA so that the allocated volume in the DA,
yDA+ts , is set to be lower than the total production capacity, X
Max, minus
XRKOMt . In addition, the up-regulation volume in the BM, y
BM+
ts , is set to
be greater or equal to XRKOMt in every hour the BM price is higher than
the DA price. Hence, the reserved capacity will be activated for the entire
hour whenever there is need for up regulation.
yDA+ts ≤ XMax −XRKOMt , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (4)
yBM+ts ≥ XRKOMt , t ∈ T , s ∈ S, P˜BMts ≥ P˜DAts (5)
No income from the RKOM is added to the objective function. Instead,
the results from reserving different capacities are intended to be compared
with the results without any reserved capacity. The total losses of reserving
capacity compared to not participating in the RKOM can then be found.
This can be used to calculate the price per reserved MW/h needed to break
even, that will be further discussed in Section 7.2.1.
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4.2 Flows and Reservoir Levels
In the original hydro power formulation, the observed behavior of the flow
between the reservoirs seemed unrealistic. Huge amounts of water were
transported as spillage or bypass from reservoir 4 to reservoir 5, which was
caused by imprecise water values. Errors in the waterways were also discov-
ered. The observed flows were unreasonable because it should not be pos-
sible to spill water unless the reservoir is full. Furthermore, huge amounts
of spillage may damage the river system. Spillage should not be profitable,
but rather a last resort if the inflow is large at high reservoir levels.
In order to deal with this challenge, several improvements that will af-
fect the river flow were implemented in the model. Firstly, the waterways
between the reservoirs were updated. The system is a simplified version of
the real system; therefore, some reservoirs are aggregated reservoirs in the
model. Because of this, some of the waterways did not accurately represent
the reality. The updated waterways are shown in Figure 10.
Another improvement is that the water values were readjusted in order
to create consistency between the reservoirs. This was a very important
and comprehensive process that is described in detail in Section 5.2.4.
Extensions of the implemented model constraints were necessary in order
to force the optimization to generate realistic results. The following sec-
tions will describe these implementations further. Section 4.2.1 describes
the improvements regarding spillage and Section 4.2.2 the improvements of
reservoir levels.
4.2.1 Allowing Spillage Under Certain Conditions Only
The initial results showed that the model could allow spillage even when
it was practically unreasonable or physically impossible. In reality, spillage
will only occur if the reservoir is full and the release from the reservoir is
at its maximum. To incorporate this in the model, an additional binary
variable, δSpill, was added. This variable should be set to zero only when
spillage is allowed and limit spillage to zero otherwise. The following re-
strictions were added to the model.
qSrts ≤ Q
V
r ∗ (1− δSpill), r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (6)
δSpill ≥ Q
V
r − qSrts
Q
V
r
, r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (7)
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δSpill ≥ Q
R
r − qRrts
Q
R
r
, r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (8)
Equation 6 limits spillage to zero if δSpill = 1, otherwise to the maximum
reservoir volume to make the restriction redundant if spillage is allowed.
Equation 7 and 8 force δSpill = 1 unless the reservoir is full and release is
at maximum, respectively.
4.2.2 Penalty Functions
Penalty functions are used for various purposes in optimization. The con-
cept is to choose a target value or boundary for one or more variables and
apply a cost of deviating from this target value.
Penalty functions were introduced because the results from the initial re-
sults showed that the behavior of some of the reservoirs were unrealistic.
Some reservoirs would be completely depleted at the end of the planning
horizon and others completely filled. While some of these problems were
gone as the water values and waterways were improved, the problems were
not entirely solved. In particular, the volume of reservoir 7 was reduced by
35-50%, depending on the season.
Reservoir 7 is a small reservoir relative to the system size, see Table 2.
Hence, the effects of changing the reservoir level will be limited. In fact,
the water values may be overruled by other larger reservoirs. E.g. if the
water values in the reservoir directly downstream are slightly too high, it
may lead to the observed behavior. Therefore, long-term water values is
not always the best way to handle small reservoirs. In reality, they may be
used as buffer reservoirs and regulated rapidly throughout the day. If this
is the case, a solution is to operate with an optimal target reservoir level at
the end of the planning horizon instead of the water values.
The purpose of the penalty functions was to illustrate how the reservoirs
can be handled with this concept. A set of linear functions describe a rela-
tion between cost inflicted to the objective function and the volume of the
reservoir in question. This is illustrated in Figure 9. The cost applied to the
objective was set to be equal or greater than all of these functions at any
given reservoir level, resulting in the cost-volume relation marked in bold
black. The mathematical description of the penalty functions can be found
in Appendix B.
The input to the model is a set of volume points and the slope of the
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cost between each of these. Since the purpose was to test the functionality,
the input was gradually adjusted towards the final values, which is listed in
Table 1. These are also the values that are used in Figure 9.
Table 1: Input data for the penalty functions for reservoir 7. Target
reservoir level is 90%.
Reservoir level, QBreakrp [%] 10 40 60 80 90 -
Slope, Crp [EUR/km
3] 5 4 3 2 1 0
Figure 9: An illustration of a set of penalty functions for reservoir 7.
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4.3 Handling Risk
The initial results showed that the expected outcome was increased by in-
cluding the BM. However, this was to a certain degree at the expense of
taking the risk of ending up in scenarios with significantly less income than
before. An initial solution to reduce risk was implemented, using a safety-
first strategy. According to [20], this strategy aims to ”minimize the ex-
pected cost while keeping the cost of all the scenarios below a safety level
or maximum allowed cost”. With the objective formulation used in this
model, this translates into maximizing expected revenue while keeping the
revenue of all the scenarios above a chosen safety level.
To incorporate the safety-first strategy into the model, the objective value
from each scenario when running with the DA market only, ObjDAs , is used
as input data. The value of each scenario objective, objs, in consecutive sim-
ulations is then forced to be greater than these, minus a tolerance factor,
λ. The previous mentioned safety level becomes ObjDAs − λ. The tolerance
factor can then be adjusted to examine how different factors influence the
objective. The is mathematically expressed in Equation 9.
objs ≥ ObjDAs − λ, s ∈ S (9)
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4.4 Issue with Integrality Tolerance
To solve the problem formulated by the model, AMPL utilizes a branching
technique to limit the search for optimal solutions. Some integer variables
from an initial continuous relaxation are fixed to integers while the other
values are adjusted towards the optimum. In this model, it is the generator
state variables, γgts, that can be used for branching, see Appendix A. In
some cases, the branching does not limit the search sufficiently to find an
optimal solution; there are too many branches with solutions very close to
the optimum. This proved to be a problem when running the data set for
week 1.
To work around this problem, the integrality tolerance in the CPLEX solver
was lowered. This tolerance decides whether or not a variable is a candidate
to be fixed to an integer value and used for branching. Valid candidates can-
not be further away from an integer value than the tolerance. The default
tolerance is 10 ∗ 10−5. After running the model with the default, an error
message suggested to reduce the value to 8 ∗ 10−8. Setting this value solved
the problem and the model finished without errors.
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5.1 The Tokke-Vinje Hydro Power System
The hydro power system that has been examined is the Tokke-Vinje system
in Telemark, Norway. The system is located in the NO2 price region of Nord
Pool Spot and consists of 11 reservoirs and 8 power plants. An overview
of the reservoirs and power plants is listed in Table 2, while Figure 10
shows the interconnections between them. In the latter, the given reservoir
numbers will be used as references to their respective reservoirs. Notice that
some reservoirs do not have any generator connected. The flow from these
reservoirs can still be regulated through what will be referred to as a gate.
The gates control the water flow in the river system, and were modeled as
a generator with zero production capacity.
Table 2: An overview of reservoirs and generators in the Tokke-Vinje
system. The hydro power units are the units immediately downstream of
the reservoirs. The production capacity is given as number of generators
times capacity per generator.
Reservoir Reservoir Size Hydro Power Production
Name Number [Mm3] Generators Capacity [MW]
Førsvatn 1 122.0 Kjela 60
Vennemo 2 23.0 - -
Songa 3 638.6 Songa 120
Totak 4 258.0 - -
V˚am˚arsvatn 5 26.2 Vinje 3 x 110
Langeidvatn 6 31.8 - -
Vatjern 7 0.4 Haukeli 2 x 2.2
Vinjevatn 8 11.2 Tokke 4 x 100
Botnedalsvatn 9 58.2 Byrte 20
Byrtevatn 10 75.5 Lio 40
Bandak 11 86.9 Hogga 16
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Figure 10: A flow chart showing all reservoirs and hydropower stations in
the Tokke-Vinje hydropower system. Arrows indicate flow direction. The
trapezoids are reservoirs, circles are hydro power plants and squares are
gates. The dotted lines represent the water way for bypass and spillage
that does not follow the same path as the discharge.
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5.2 Model Input
The model was run for four different weeks: 1, 14, 27 and 44. For each
week, the model was run once with the BM deactivated, so that only DA
trading is allowed, referred to as DA Only. In addition, the model was run
three times with different input prices in the BM. These cases are referred
to as Normal BM, Vol1 and Vol2, and are further explained in Section 5.2.1.
The data used was gathered from different data sets supplied by SINTEF
Energy Research and modified to fit the model format. This includes a data
set describing the system in Short term Hydro power Optimization Program
(SHOP) [21] and an Excel sheet that summarize the inflow to the reservoir,
start up cost and generator capacities, accompanied by detailed inflow data
in text-files. Prices were gathered from the Nord Pool Spot FTP-server [22].
The different modifications are explained in the following sections.
5.2.1 Price Input
The price input to the model is based on historical prices that are gath-
ered from the Nord Pool Spot FTP-server. The balancing market has only
been in operation since 2010. Therefore, data from 2010 to 2014 was used
to generate DA and BM price scenarios. The DA prices that were used
are unmodified historical prices. The market prices were analyzed further
to find statistical trends that connect the DA and BM prices. Based on
these findings, balancing price scenarios were generated. Furthermore, fu-
ture price scenarios that reflect the expected increase in intermittent energy
was developed.
An overview of the simulated market scenarios is presented below in Table
3. The price scenarios will be further described in the following sections.
The calculations of the generated price scenarios can be found in Appendix
C in the files ScenariosNordic.xlsx and ScenarioGermany.xlsx.
Table 3: Simulated market scenarios
Market case Description
DA only No trade in the BM
Normal BM
Trade in the BM activated, BM prices based on
historical data from NO2 without modifications
Vol1 Probability of BM prices adjusted
Vol2 Price difference and probability of BM prices adjusted
RKOMX
BM prices as in the Normal case, RKOM activated
with X MW/h reserved capacity
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5.2.1.1 Scenario Generation of DA Prices
In order to have price input with high validity in the optimization model,
price scenarios were generated based on historical price observations. Four
time periods were chosen:
• week 1 to simulate the depletion season
• week 14 at the end of the depletion season when the reservoirs are
close to empty, but still depleting.
• week 27 when the reservoirs are still filling up.
• week 44 when the reservoirs are full, shortly after the depletion season
has started.
Weekends typically have different load profiles than weekdays. In order to
avoid using weekend days, the first day of the relevant weeks were used.
The DA prices for the relevant day in year 2010 to 2014 were utilized to
create the first stage in a scenario, see Section 3.3. Hence, the DA prices
were divided into five groups to see the effect that different BM prices have,
given the same spot price.
5.2.1.2 Scenario Generation of BM Prices
The balancing prices were generated by analyzing the historical prices. The
seasons were divided into three periods based on the seasons’ characteristics:
spring (week 1-17), filling season (week 18- 39) and the fall (week 40-52).
The historical up- and down-regulation patterns were analyzed to be able to
develop realistic price scenarios. The price difference between the DA and
BM price was calculated for every hour within the respective weeks in the
years 2010-2014. The price differences were then divided into intervals of 1
EUR and the number of occurrences in each interval was counted. Figure
11 illustrates this statistics for week 1-17. Identical analysis is performed for
the other seasons, which can be found in Appendix C in PriceStatistics.xlsx.
The up-and down-regulation patterns were then used to create seven price
difference intervals that were used as BM price scenarios. The weighted av-
erage sum in each interval with corresponding probability of ending up in the
interval was calculated. The result is presented in Table 4. The displayed
probabilities are for a given DA scenario. As there are five DA scenarios,
these must be divided by five in order to find the overall probability of each
BM scenario.
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Figure 11: Number of events with up- and down-regulation, week 1-17.
Table 4: Range of price differences between DA and BM with correspond-
ing probabilities, Normal BM, week 1.
BM Price difference Probability
scenario [EUR/MWh] [%]
1 -75.17 0.26
2 -19.74 2.84
3 -5.69 52.46
4 0.00 15.30
5 4.40 26.84
6 22.31 1.55
7 111.07 0.75
The intervals in the table above were used to create seven balancing price
scenarios connected to each of the five DA nodes. One branch in the scenario
tree is illustrated below. The DA price with corresponding BM outcomes
represents seven scenarios. The altogether five branches create 35 scenarios
that were implemented in the optimization model.
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Figure 12: The lower part of the scenario tree. The full tree consists of
five DA price nodes, each with seven balancing price nodes connected.
Further analysis was conducted in order to examine if it is possible to predict
the outcome of the BM when the DA price is known. The number of up-
and down-regulation occurrences as function of average daily DA prices are
shown in the scatter plots in Figure 13 and 14. These figures were generated
using the Matlab script in Appendix G. Figures for the other time periods
can be found in Appendix H. As the figures demonstrate, there are no
clear patterns of when up- and down-regulation occurs. Both the number
of up- and down-regulations seem to be distributed roughly the same way
across the DA prices. The only clear difference is that there are more down-
than up-regulations at all price levels. Thus, the DA-price does not give
information about the outcome of the regulation direction in the BM. This
implies that the market is efficient.
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Figure 13: Number of up-regulations each day as function of average DA
price the respective day, week 1-17.
Figure 14: Number of down-regulations each day as function of average
DA price the respective day, week 1-17.
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5.2.1.3 Price Scenario Generation of Future BM Prices
Based on the reasoning in Section 2.5.1, it is expected a higher price volatil-
ity in the future as a consequence of increased intermittent generation. To
simulate this, the model was run two additional times for each time period.
The price difference intervals from the Normal BM situation were modified
in two stages, referred to as Vol1 and Vol2. This is shown in Table 5. The
values in the table are based on the following:
Price Volatility 1 (Vol1)
The price differences are identical as in the Normal BM case, while the
probabilities were changed. The probability of no regulation, i.e. scenario
4, was halved as it is more likely that regulation is needed. The reduction
in probability of scenario 4 was distributed across scenarios 2, 3, 5 and 6 so
that the probability of these scenarios were increased with an equal amount
relative to the probability of the respective scenarios. The probability of
the extreme scenarios 1 and 7 were kept constant. This is because these
scenarios likely are due to rare events such as outages and will likely not
become more frequent.
Price Volatility 2 (Vol2)
The probability distribution is the same as for Vol1, but with higher price
differences in scenario 3 and 5. The price difference in these scenarios was
doubled. This is to simulate an increased demand for regulation in the
scenarios with high probability.
Table 5: Range of price differences between DA and BM with correspond-
ing probabilities, week 1.
Vol1 Vol2
BM Price difference Probability Price difference Probability
scenario [EUR/MWh] [%] [EUR/MWh] [%]
1 -75.17 0.26 -75.17 0.26
2 -19.74 3.10 -19.74 3.10
3 -5.69 57.26 -11.39 57.26
4 0.00 7.65 0.00 7.65
5 4.40 29.29 8.81 29.29
6 22.31 1.69 22.31 1.69
7 111.07 0.75 111.07 0.75
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5.2.1.4 Price Scenario Generation of Future DA Prices
To simulate another scenario of the future power market, the model was
run with historical German DA prices. There are two reasons to do so:
• The German system has a larger share of renewable energy genera-
tion and therefore represent a possible future Nordic system with an
increased share of renewables.
• It is expected that the Nordic system will become more closely con-
nected to Germany in the future, as explained in Section 2.2.2.
The spot price volatility in Germany is higher than the situation based
on the Nordic spot market, mostly because the German generation mix is
based on thermal power and contains a high share of intermittent energy.
The German market prices were supplied by SINTEF Energy Research and
originate from the EPEX Spot FTP-server [23]. The prices were scaled so
that the average price across all the DA scenarios became equal to that in
the Nordic price case. This was to create consistency with the water values.
Week 1 was chosen as time period to simulate the model with historical
German market prices. The price scenarios were divided into three differ-
ent situations identically as in the section above: Normal BM, Vol1 and
Vol2. Again, this was to simulate different levels of intermittent generation.
5.2.2 PQ-Curves
For each power generator, the SHOP data set provides a table of generator
efficiency at different values of mechanical input power and one to three
tables of turbine efficiencies at different discharges. Each turbine efficiency
table is valid at a given head.
The mentioned tables were copied into Excel. The calculations needed to
convert the values to PQ-curves were done using basic Excel functions and
the Matlab script in Appendix E. First, the shaft power Pshaft was found
for each discharge in the turbine efficiency tables, using Equation 10.
Pshaft = ρghqEturb(q) (10)
ρ is the density of water, g is the gravity acceleration, h is the head, q is
discharge through the generator and E(q) the turbine efficiency.
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The shaft power found does not necessarily fit the values listed in the gen-
erator table. Because of this, the Matlab script was used to interpolate
linearly in the generator table to find the efficiencies corresponding to the
values from the turbine table.
Having found the correct generator efficiency, Egen(q), for each discharge,
the output power was found by multiplying the generator efficiency with
the shaft power. The output power with corresponding discharge level gives
the break points of the PQ-curve.
This curve may however not be concave. To check this, the properties of
a concave function were analysed. The derivative of the function has to be
non-negative, i.e. the slope can never increase. This leads to the conclusion
that if the curve starts in the origin and one draws a line from the origin
to any other point on the PQ-curve, every point previous has to lie at or
above this line. This means that the first break point of a concave function
has to be the point with the highest X/Y ratio. This corresponds to the
point with the maximal total efficiency (Eturb(q) ∗ Egen(q)).
Different strategies could have been chosen too make sure that the con-
cave PQ-curve deviates as little as possible from the real one. Since most
generators typically will be operated close to their maximum efficiency, the
accuracy around this point was prioritized. The first break point was there-
fore copied directly from the efficiency table. If possible, this was also the
case for consecutive breakpoints. In the cases where the slope increased
from one line segment to the next, the previous line segment was simply ex-
tended. As a graphical example, Figure 15 show the original and adjusted
PQ-curves for Vinje 2.
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Figure 15: Original and adjusted PQ-curve of Vinje 2.
5.2.3 Inflow
The inflow does not affect the short-term scheduling notably, as described
in Section 2.5.2. For this reason, the inflow was set equal for all scenarios.
Detailed data for inflow through the year was not available for each reservoir,
instead yearly average inflow data provided from SINTEF Energy Research
was used. In the Tokke-Vinje system, all inflow is regulated. The yearly
inflow was spread across the year using data from nearby measuring stations,
which has daily or weekly resolution of the average inflow. The yearly
inflow to the reservoir was divided across the year, corresponding to the
inflow distribution from the measuring stations. This was done by using
Equation 11, where QRrt is the hourly regulated inflow used as model input
and QRr,year is the yearly inflow. Q
R
mt is the hourly inflow to the nearest
measuring station and QRm,year is the yearly inflow to the same measuring
station. QRmt was calculated by dividing the daily or weekly inflow which
was provided by the number of hours per day or week respectively.
QRrt = Q
R
r,year ∗
QRmt
QRm,year
(11)
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5.2.4 Water Values and Initial Reservoir Level
The marginal water value cuts were calculated in ProdRisk [16] in order
to create consistency between short- and long-term optimization. Further
explanations about the concept of seasonal scheduling and water value cuts
are found in Section 2.4.2 and 2.4.4. ProdRisk is a stochastic dual dynamic
programming model developed by SINTEF that creates consistency between
inflow- and price scenarios that are generated in EMPS. Several water value
cuts are calculated around a reference price and reservoir levels. Hence, it
was necessary to find a way to specify these reference levels, which is ex-
plained below. This is followed by information about how ProdRisk was run.
The reference price level for each time period was found by calculating
the average day-ahead price during all of the DA scenarios for each time
period. These prices are historical prices found on Nord Pool Spot’s FTP-
server. The results of this calculation can be found in Appendix C.
The average reservoir levels for the time periods in question were not avail-
able for all the magazines. However, the revision document [24] presents
filling profiles in the Tokke-Vinje area. Reference values were chosen based
on this material for the relevant weeks, see Table 6. The exception is Vinje-
vatn which is kept at 50% at all times according to the revision document.
The initial reservoir levels in the AMPL model were set equal to the ref-
erence values in ProdRisk, enabling the calculation of the marginal water
values in the river system.
Table 6: Reference values for water value calculations.
Week Reservoir level Average DA price [ EUR
MWh
]
1 75% 44.17
14 35% 42.49
27 90% 33.22
44 85% 34.94
To calculate the expected future value of the water, ProdRisk uses price
input in csv-format. Prices are divided into four price sections, which rep-
resents night, off peak daytime, peak daytime and weekend. Each price
interval is valid for one week and there are 156 weeks in one year; thus
one year in ProdRisk spans three real years. The predefined settings in
the version of ProdRisk was to use data from the fifty years 1931 to 1980.
Because the access to these settings was limited, the market data from [19]
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was modified to fit this format using the Matlab script in Appendix F. Since
only data for 1996-2014 was available, the data was copied until all years
were filled. The result is that ProdRisk year 1931 contains year 1996-1998,
ProdRisk year 1932 contains 1997-1999 and so on until all real years were
used. Then the real years were started over to fill the rest of the ProdRisk
years.
5.2.5 Bid Curves
The model can be run without using bid curves. In this case, the optimal so-
lution for each day-ahead scenario will be independent of the solution in the
other scenarios. The deciding factor for the optimal DA volume is whether
or not the expected BM price will be higher or lower than the DA price.
This means that one could end up in a situation where it is more beneficial
to sell in the DA if the price is low than if it is high. Since Nord Pool Spot
requires offered volumes to be non-decreasing with price, this is not possible.
To comply with the rules of Nord Pool Spot, bid curves were introduced.
The bid curves are made up of 64 price points, which is the maximum
allowed number of bids per order according to [9]. The price points are dis-
tributed uniformly between a point slightly below the lowest and one above
the highest input DA price. The model then decides upon the volumes that
should be offered at each price point. This is implemented in Equations
C.26 to C.33.
Bid curves are not necessary in the BM, as the optimal volume will de-
pend on the BM price only because it is the last node of the scenario tree.
5.2.6 Initial and Default Values
All initial flows and generator spinning states were set equal to those that
were used in the data set provided by SINTEF and are equal in all simu-
lations. This is not necessarily accurate compared to a normal situation.
Since the start up costs are low, it should however not affect the outcome
notably. Data for time lag between reservoirs were also left unchanged from
the SINTEF data set.
It is difficult to estimate a value for the cost of damage imposed by large
amounts on spillage. However, with the implementation explained in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 and a spillage cost limit of 20 m3, there were no spillage with the
exception of a 0.03 to 0.04 m
3
s spillage from reservoir 8 in hour 24 in week
27. One can therefore conclude that the spillage cost does not affect the
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optimal solution noteworthy. A value of 1000 EUR/m
3
s from the SINTEF
data set was therefore left unchanged.
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This section introduces the main results from the simulations. The expected
income with and without the BM is simulated with prices based on histor-
ical Nordic market prices. Price volatility is then introduced to see how it
affects the profitability. The same procedure is repeated when the market
prices are based on historical German market prices. A closer description
of the market cases simulated are found in Table 3. The results have been
handled in the Excel sheet results.xlsx that accompanies this report, which
is explained in Appendix C. All the results will be analyzed in Section 7.
6.1 Objective Function
Table 7 shows the objective output and distribution between each contribut-
ing factor when the BM is disabled. The same values are displayed in Table
8 with the Normal BM prices included, see Section 5.2.1. This table also
shows the net gain in objective value from including the BM. These results
will be analysed in Section 7.1.1.
As Table 7 and 8 illustrate, the start up- and spillage costs are insignificant
compared with the other contributing factors; therefore, they will not be
displayed in the rest of the results. The values can be found in results.xlsx.
Table 7: Value of objective and contributing factors with BM disabled
[kEUR
day
].
Week 1 Week 14 Week 27 Week 44
Spillage cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Start up cost 0.70 0.70 1.10 0.40
Day-ahead income 900.76 838.08 669.38 728.73
Increased water value -504.13 -491.49 526.44 -343.40
Objective 395.13 344.79 1193.72 383.72
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Table 8: Value of objective and contributing factors with BM included.
Price input according to the normal case [kEUR
day
].
Week 1 Week 14 Week 27 Week 44
Spillage cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Start up cost 1.16 0.53 1.46 1.02
Day-ahead income 1001.99 935.78 695.43 728.73
Balancing market income -102.70 -72.47 -18.84 6.88
Increased water value -481.35 -496.54 526.98 -340.52
Objective 415.85 365.01 1201.46 392.72
Gain from including BM 20.72 20.22 7.74 9.00
as % of original income 5.24% 5.86% 0.65% 2.35%
6.1.1 Introduction of Price Volatility
Different levels of price volatility between DA and BM are introduced in
order to represent the future with a high intermittent energy penetration.
The different cases with increasing level of price volatility are referred to as
Normal BM, Vol1 and Vol2, respectively. See Section 5.2.1.1 for explanation.
Figure 16 shows the total change in objective value, while Figure 17, 18
and 19 show the income from the DA and BM and the increased water
value, respectively. These will be discussed in Section 7.1.2.
Figure 16: Objective value for all time periods [kEUR
day
].
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Figure 17: Income from day-ahead market for all time periods [kEUR
day
].
Figure 18: Income from balancing market for all time periods [kEUR
day
].
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Figure 19: Increased value of total unused water in all reservoirs [kEUR
day
].
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6.2 Introducing German Market Prices
The same procedure covering DA, Normal BM, Vol1 and Vol2 is conducted
with DA price scenarios based on historical German prices. Section 5.2.1.4
provides information about the price scenario generation. The objective
value and its contributing factors are examined and compared with the
Nordic price cases from the section above.
Figure 20 summarizes the objective values with varying price volatility. Ta-
ble 9 specifies the changes in income when the price scenarios are based
on German prices instead of Nordic prices. Figure 21 displays how the
contributing factors are affected by the German prices. The information
is based on simulations of week 1. The result will be discussed in Section
7.1.4.
Figure 20: Expected profit with price scenarios based on Nordic and Ger-
man market prices [kEUR
day
], week 1.
Table 9: Increase in objective value with different market cases compared
to DA only, week 1.
Increase in objective value
Normal BM Vol1 Vol2
[kEUR] 199.54 199.49 199.79
[%] 59.61 % 59.60 % 59.69%
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Figure 21: Expected income for different factors based on German market
prices, week 1 [kEUR
day
].
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6.3 Including the RKOM
To examine how the RKOM can be utilized, the model is run with three
different reserved capacities. An explanation of the implementation can be
found in Section 4.1. Table 10 and 11 show the results from the simulations
for week 1 and 44, respectively. These results will be analysed in Section
7.2.1 and 7.2.3.
Table 10: Change in results when introducing the RKOM compared to
the Normal BM case for week 1.
Capacity reserved in RKOM [MW/h] 20 50 80
Day-ahead income [kEUR] -19.54 -41.55 -69.37
Balancing market income [kEUR] 8.66 21.18 36.52
Increased water value [kEUR] 8.19 13.56 21.90
Objective [kEUR] -2.68 -6.78 -10.91
Table 11: Change in results when introducing the RKOM compared to
the Normal BM case for week 44.
Capacity reserved in RKOM [MW/h] 20 50 80
Day-ahead income [kEUR] -9.94 -34.04 -48.25
Balancing market income [kEUR] 6.10 21.50 28.55
Increased water value [kEUR] 3.23 10.60 16.12
Objective [kEUR] -0.60 -2.13 -3.84
There were similarities between how the RKOM and the risk implementa-
tion affected the results. Therefore, it was necessary to look at the volumes
traded in the different markets for these cases. Figure 22 shows the volumes
traded in week 1 for the relevant scenarios. These will be compared with
the results from the risk simulations in Section 7.2.3.
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Figure 22: Average volumes traded hourly in week 1 [MWh].
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6.4 Handling Risk
The method for handling risk is intended to illustrate a concept; therefore,
the risk handling is tested for week 14 only. In this week, several scenarios
had lower revenues with the BM included than with DA only and was there-
fore suitable. The implementation of the risk handling method is explained
in Section 4.3.
The model is run with four different tolerance factors, λ: 1, 5, 10 and
15 kEUR. An overview of the results are displayed in Figure 23, while Table
12 shows the absolute and percentile reduction in objective value. Table
13 shows the DA income in the second column followed by the difference
compared to it at different values of λ. This will be analysed in Section
7.2.2.
Figure 23: Income at different safety levels, week 14.
Table 12: Increase in objective value for different safety levels. Value of λ
in [kEUR].
Increase in objective
λ = 15 λ = 10 λ = 5 λ = 1
[kEUR] -0.30 -0.55 -0.86 -2.30
[%] -0.08 % -0.15 % -0.24 % -0.63 %
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Table 13: DA scenario income and change in scenario income at different
risk safety levels [kEUR].
DA Difference compared to DA income
income Normal BM λ = 15 λ = 10 λ = 5 λ = 1
s01 409.28 1301.22 1301.22 1301.22 1301.22 1301.22
s02 409.28 65.59 65.59 65.59 65.59 65.59
s03 409.28 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
s04 409.28 0 0 0 0 0
s05 409.28 0 0 0 0 0
s06 409.28 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
s07 409.28 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12
s08 808.33 903.7 903.7 903.7 903.7 903.7
s09 808.33 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
s10 808.33 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1
s11 808.33 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
s12 808.33 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
s13 808.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
s14 808.33 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
s15 32.14 1347.71 1194.37 1108.47 1010.83 895.14
s16 32.14 316.19 275.92 253.36 227.72 197.34
s17 32.14 69.3 57.7 51.2 43.8 35.05
s18 32.14 -24.29 -15 -10 -5 -1
s19 32.14 -24.3 -14.83 -9.8 -4.08 2.69
s20 32.14 32.95 78.46 103.96 132.94 167.27
s21 32.14 425.05 651.62 778.54 922.81 1093.75
s22 443.88 1266.62 1266.62 1266.62 1266.62 1266.62
s23 443.88 44.84 44.24 45.73 45.7 45.56
s24 443.88 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
s25 443.88 0 0 0 0 0
s26 443.88 0 0 0 0 0
s27 443.88 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
s28 443.88 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
s29 30.32 1378.33 1310.36 1233.86 1152.21 807.87
s30 30.32 325.37 307.52 287.43 265.99 175.56
s31 30.32 72.86 67.71 61.92 55.74 29.68
s32 30.32 -19.96 -15 -10 -5 -1
s33 30.32 -19.96 -4.37 -4.37 -4.37 15.81
s34 30.32 39.09 106.2 106.2 106.2 208.4
s35 30.32 397.19 731.3 731.3 731.3 1240.1
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As explained in Section 6.3, it was necessary to look at the volumes traded
in the DA and BM for different levels of risk reduction. Figure 24 shows
the volumes traded in week 14 for the relevant simulations. These will be
compared with the results from the RKOM simulations in Section 7.2.3.
Figure 24: Average volumes traded hourly in week 14 [MWh].
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6.5 System Behaviour
With the new waterways and limits on spillage, the behavior of the system
was improved. This section provides information about the system behavior
in the optimal solution. These results will be discussed in Section 7.2.
6.5.1 Spillage
With the new implementation to inhibit spillage, see Section 4.2.1, there
is no spillage from any of the reservoirs in any of the simulations. The
exception is week 27, where some spillage occur from reservoir 8 in the last
hour of some of the scenarios. The largest spillage is observed during the
Volatility-simulations, where the weighted average of this spillage across
the scenarios is 0.04m3. This is considered a negligible amount and will
therefore not be analysed further.
6.5.2 Changes in Reservoir Level
The change in reservoir level from the beginning of the planning horizon to
the end is large for some reservoirs. This trend is similar for all weeks. For
the purpose of this analysis, the focus will be on week 27. Corresponding
results for the other weeks can be found in the accompanying Excel sheet
results.xlsx in Appendix C.
As Figure 25 shows, the reservoir level of reservoir 7 was reduced by around
40% of its maximum capacity, while reservoir 8 was increased by around
30%.
Figure 25: Change in reservoir level week 27.
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6.5.3 Introducing Penalty Functions
As explained in Section 4.2.2, penalty functions are introduced in order to
force reservoirs to stay closer to a chosen target level. Penalty functions are
applied to reservoir 7 only and are the same as those shown in Figure 9.
Figure 26 shows that the volume of reservoir 7 is reduced less than without
the penalty functions, from -41.84% to -26.96%. The penalty cost of this
change was 180 EUR/day, while the total objective losses amounted to 300
EUR/day, making the net loss 120 EUR/day. This corresponds to a 0.01%
decrease in total income.
Figure 26: Change in reservoir level week 27 with and without penalty
functions.
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7 Analysis
This section covers a discussion of the results. The findings from the opti-
mization of the original model will be described in the Section 7.1. Section
7.2 covers a discussion of the results from the simulations where the model
is modified.
7.1 Model Characteristics
7.1.1 Optimal Expected Income
Table 7 and 8 compare the expected income when participating in the bal-
ancing market in addition to the day-ahead market. As the tables demon-
strate, the highest increase in expected income occurs in the depletion sea-
son, constituting an additional gain of 20.75 kEUR per day. The benefit of
participating in BM is also notable for the other seasons.
This finding is as expected with the following reasoning. Suppose the DA
allocation from the simulation without the BM should be kept with no
changes. It is clear that allowing trade in the BM afterwards would provide
at least the same solution. Most likely the solution will be improved, as
some prices in the BM should provide beneficial trade options. In addition,
letting the model choose the optimal allocation in the DA based on the
expected BM price will provide an equal or better solution. Some scenar-
ios could provide worse results, which will be further discussed in section
7.2.2, but the expected total outcome will always be at least as good when
including more trade options.
The results presented in the tables also provide information about how
the gains are achieved. When the total income from the DA increases by
including BM, the BM income is negative. This is the case in week 1, 14
and 27, as shown in Table 8. This indicates that the gains are achieved
by bidding more into the DA and then down-regulate in the BM. The vol-
umes traded in the different markets support this conclusion. Graphs that
show the volumes are found in results.xlsx under the tabs named ”Compare
<week number>”.
For week 44, the DA income is unchanged and the BM income is posi-
tive. With the above reasoning, this indicates that up-regulation is domi-
nant. However, the volume graphs show that there is slightly more down-
regulation. Hence, there is more volume traded as down-regulation, but the
prices make the total income larger from up-regulation. This explains the
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positive BM income in week 44.
The increase in value of the unused water is smaller in week 14 and 27
when including the BM. This indicates that the overall production level is
increased. The opposite is the case for week 1 and 44.
7.1.2 Impact of Price Volatility
Figure 16 shows that when the volatility of the balancing prices increase,
the overall income increases. This is as expected. The original solution
shows that the optimal solution is to use the price difference between the
DA and the BM to create increased revenues. When the price difference
increases, the revenues are likely to increase or at least stay unchanged.
Furthermore, the profitability in both markets is affected. This is illustrated
in Figure 17 and 18. The DA income increases or remains unchanged with
price volatility in all the seasons. Since down-regulation was dominant in
all the four weeks with normal prices, it is to be expected that the model
will down-regulate even more as the volatility increase. Bidding more into
the DA opens up for more down-regulation in the BM.
The BM income is most affected by the changes, with the income expected
to decrease with the volatility in most of the cases. In week 27, for instance,
the balancing income is expected to decrease with 107.1% and 340.7% for
Vol1 and Vol2, respectively. The decrease in BM income corresponds well
with the above-reasoning that the model aims to down-regulate more as
volatility increases.
The Vol2 case in week 14 and 44 deviate from the general pattern. While
the absolute value of the income in the BM becomes larger in the dom-
inating direction with increasing volatility, the opposite happens in these
cases. This indicates that there is a turning point where the benefits from
the opposite direction becomes dominating. In week 14, this means that
up-regulation constitutes a larger share of the income than before. A rea-
son for this could be that further down-regulation gives end reservoir levels
that result in low water values. Each additional unit of down-regulation
will give decreasing benefits as each additional unit in the reservoirs will be
decreasingly valuable.
The deviation in week 44 has a similar explanation as above. As explained
in Section 7.1.1, the traded volumes show that down-regulation is dominant,
even though the income in the BM is positive. The reason that the BM in-
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come changes direction in the Vol2 case is likely because the income from
up-regulation reaches a maximum. Because the volume traded in the DA
is close to the maximum capacity, approximately 912 out of 990 MWh/h,
the possibility of up-regulation is limited. The negative income from down-
regulation therefore becomes dominant.
7.1.3 Seasonal Variations
Seasonal variations should be reflected by the increase in water value, which
is shown in Figure 19. The reason is that the goal of the seasonal planning is
to handle the reservoir level to yield optimal income over time. This means
that during the filling season, the reservoir levels should generally increase,
while in the depletion season they should decrease.
As Figure 19 illustrates, this is also the case. In week 1, 14 and 44, the
water value is reduced, which means that the reservoirs are emptying. The
opposite is the case for week 27, when the reservoir fills up again. This in-
dicates that the connection to the long term scheduling through the water
values works as intended.
7.1.4 Impact of German Market Prices
Section 6.2 presents the main results when German market prices are im-
plemented in the model. The most important findings are illustrated in
Figure 20, and the changes in the objective value are specified in Table 9.
The revenues are 15.28% lower than in the Nordic price case when the BM
is not active. When the BM is included, however, the objective function
increases by 59.61% from the original income of 334.74%. The new income
is 28.48% higher than the same scenario with the Nordic prices. Thus, the
results suggest that value of including the BM is even higher if the prices
develop to become more similar to the German prices. This is expected to
happen, as explained in Section 5.2.1.4, and underlines the need to include
the BM in production planning.
As Figure 20 shows, the income does not increase as much with price volatil-
ity with the German prices as with the Nordic. In fact it is slightly reduced
in the Vol1 case. This can be explained supported by the illustration in
Figure 27. A consequence of the volatile German DA prices is that some
DA prices will be very high and other prices very low. This will lead to
very high and very low DA volumes, respectively. The results in the Excel
sheet results.xlsx under the tab ”Compare Ger” verifies that this is the case.
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Because the traded DA volumes are close to either the production cap or
zero the regulation in one direction will often be limited, as illustrated in
Figure 27. The trend in the BM will therefore be to down-regulate when
the DA prices are high and up-regulate when the prices are low. If there are
approximately an equal amount of hours with high and low DA prices, the
overall BM outcome will not change notably. Both the negative BM income
when the DA prices are high and the positive BM income when the DA
prices are low will increase, but the sum of the BM income changes little.
Figure 27: Illustration of how DA price volatility limits BM regulation.
Figure 21 confirms that this could be the case. The DA income is increased
slightly with price volatility, which allows more down-regulation than in
previous results. The difference compared to the Nordic DA price case is
that the DA volumes are already close to the production limit. By bidding
more in the DA, the income from up-regulation will be reduced. In compari-
son, Figure 28 shows a case which is common with the Nordic prices, where
a moderate volume is traded in the DA. Even if the DA volume should
be increased slightly in order to allow more down-regulation, there is still
room for up-regulation if required. The result is that with the German DA
prices, the increase in DA income and remaining water value barely covers
the decrease in income in the BM.
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Figure 28: Illustration of normal DA prices and corresponding BM regu-
lation.
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7.2 Model Modifications
7.2.1 Including the RKOM
With the RKOM restrictions included in the model, the objective value is
reduced by up to -10.91 kEUR per day, as shown in Table 10 and 11. The
tables also show that the DA income is reduced, while the BM income is
increased with larger RKOM capacity. This is as expected, as the restric-
tions force the producer to hold back in the DA and sell up-regulation when
needed. The up-regulation volume in the BM is also larger or equal to the
reserved capacity for all scenarios with higher BM than DA price, see Excel
sheet results.xlsx in Appendix C. This indicates that the implementation
works as intended. An explanation of the implementation is found in Sec-
tion 4.1
The goal of this implementation is to estimate a price per MW/h that
the producer would need to get payed in order to break even compared to
not trading in the RKOM. This is done by using Equation 12.
PRKOM =
∆Obj ∗ 1000
XRKOM ∗ 18 (12)
∆Obj is the reduction in objective function in kEUR compared to the Nor-
mal BM case. XRKOM is the reserved RKOM capacity, measured in MW/h
in each of the 18 daytime hours. The resulting price per MW/h, PRKOM ,
is listed in Table 14.
Table 14: RKOM price required to break even for different reserved RKOM
capacities.
PRKOM [EUR/MW/h]
RKOM volume [MW/h] Week 1 Week 44
20 7.44 1.67
50 7.53 2.37
80 7.58 2.67
RKOM is a new market, thus the only existing market data available is
from the winter 2014/2015. This data can be found in Appendix D. The
data shows that the traded capacity in the RKOM was highest in the weeks
2 through 10. The price peaked in week 6 at 10.6 EUR/MW/h, using an
exchange rate of 8.5 NOK/EUR, which was the only price level that would
make it beneficial for the producer to participate in week 1. The PRKOM
in week 44 is lower, but it would not be beneficial to trade before the price
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reaches the level of week 3, i.e. 1.765 EUR/MW/h.
The producer takes a risk by participating that is not accounted for in
the above calculations because the RKOM is cleared for an entire week at a
time. This risk will be weighted against the expected increase in revenues.
The results show that the conditions for which the revenues are increased
were rare during the winter season 2014/2015. Therefore, the RKOM does
not currently seem very attractive for this particular producer. However,
this conclusion may change if the RKOM prices rise in the future.
7.2.2 Handling Risk
The ten scenarios that are highlighted in Table 13 are affected when the
safety level of risk is introduced. As the table shows, it is scenario 18, 19,
32 and 33 that force the change in the market income as these originally had
a lower income than the applied safety level. These are all scenarios with
a relatively high probability. Each of scenario 18 and 32 has a 4.33% and
scenario 19 and 33 a 6.42% probability of occurring, which makes the total
probability of ending up in any of these scenarios 21.50%. The probability
of the BM scenarios, given a DA scenario, are displayed in Table 4.
The outcome in all of these scenarios is significantly improved. When λ = 1,
the 21.50% chance of ending up in a scenario with losses around 20000 e is
reduced to a 8.7% chance of a loss of 1000 e. This is at the cost of a 2300
e reduction in expected income, as Table 12 points out. This is valuable
decision support for a producer.
An interesting observation in Table 13 is the distribution of the risk. As
mentioned above, all the scenarios that constitute a risk are relatively proba-
ble. The scenarios with very low probability all give positive income changes,
most of them give very large incomes. This is also valuable knowledge for
the producer as there are no scenarios with very low probability and dra-
matically worse income than in the DA Only case. This means that if the
producer choose to disregard the risk, he will experience low-income days
relatively frequently, but no extreme negative days. The producer will have
to decide whether or not the frequent low income days are worth the ex-
pected increase in income.
The safety-first strategy is rigid, as it does not weigh unfavorable outcomes
with respect to probability. Regardless, the results show that it efficiently
removes risk connected to unfavorable scenarios. It is however important
that one does not confuse this reduction in risk with the risk of inaccurate
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scenarios. The latter is connected to the likelihood of being wrong when
predicting the future and is not examined in this thesis. The implemented
risk reduction is based on the assumption that all the scenarios and corre-
sponding probabilities are correct.
7.2.3 Comparing Reduced Risk with RKOM
Figure 23 shows the distribution of the income when the safety level of risk
is introduced. The income in the DA and the negative income in the BM
are both reduced. Less volume is traded in the DA and the trade in the
BM is shifted upwards with less down-regulation and more up-regulation.
As down-regulation is the general trend in all weeks, this leads to the con-
clusion that the risk is reduced when the balancing market is utilized less.
Table 10 and 11 display the same for the RKOM simulations for week 1
and 44, respectively. The tables show a pattern that is very similar the
pattern in the risk reduction simulations. It was therefore interesting to
compare the volumes in these scenarios.
Figure 22 and 24 confirm the similarities found in the income distribu-
tion. Both when the risk level is increased (λ is decreased) and when the
RKOM capacity is increased, the volume is shifted from the BM over to the
DA. Clearly, the expected outcome is increased by bidding more into the
DA and then buy down-regulation in the BM to avoid producing too much.
The risk is connected to scenarios where the BM price is higher than the DA
price so that the producer will be forced to produce more than otherwise
optimal. The cap that the RKOM impose on the DA volume reduces the
risk of having to produce too much, which is why the RKOM results are so
similar to the results from simulations with reduced risk.
With respect to what was mentioned in Section 7.2.1, there is a risk in
making a decision to reserve capacity a week before it is produced. The risk
implementation, however, shows that the risk is reduced when less volume
is traded in the DA. Hence, the producer must consider following aspects
when deciding whether to bid in the RKOM or not; he must weigh the risk
involved in allocating capacity a week ahead against the possible increase in
income and the reduction in risk caused by the change in bidding strategy.
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7.2.4 Including Penalty Functions
Figure 26 shows the change in reservoir levels with and without penalty
functions on reservoir 7. The behavior in this reservoir changed as intended
as the large negative change in reservoir level is reduced. The change in
objective value is small because the reservoir is small compared to the sys-
tem size, see Section 5.1. This supports the assertion that small reservoirs
should not be handled by long term water values as these have very little
impact on the objective value.
With the penalty functions included in the model, the water value of reser-
voir 7 was not excluded from the objective. The model will still weigh the
penalty cost of deviating from the target volume against the other benefits,
including the value of the unused water. This is acceptable for the pur-
pose of testing the impact of penalty functions. The results are directly
comparable with previous results as only an additional cost is added. For
real life use, it may however be better to exclude the reservoirs that are
being handled by penalty functions from the water value calculations. This
is because the reason for including penalty functions was to find a way to
handle reservoirs that are regulated on short-term basis. Long term water
values are not necessarily suitable to handle such reservoirs.
If one should exclude reservoir 7 from the water value calculations, the
penalty cost would still be weighted against the remaining sources of in-
come. It is in this case important that the cost reflects the short term
optimal production plan, so that the penalty cost reflects the cost and risk
involved in deviating from the target volume.
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The results of the optimization have shown that a hydro power producer in
the case-study area increases the expected income by participating in the
balancing market. The results suggest that by utilizing the balancing mar-
ket, the profit may increase with 5.24%, 5.86%, 0.65% and 2.35%, for week 1,
14, 27 and 44, respectively. This is compared with the original income when
bidding into the day-ahead market only. The highest increase in expected
income occurred in week 1, i.e. the depletion season. It constituted an addi-
tional gain of 20.75 kEUR per day, from an original income of 415.88 kEUR.
The model was also run with German day-ahead prices for week 1. This was
to account for a stronger future connection with the German market and
because the German power market already has a large share of intermittent
generation. With these prices, the gain from including the balancing mar-
ket was even greater than with the Nordic prices. The increase was 199.54
kEUR per day, which corresponds to a 59.61% increase from the original
income of 334.74 kEUR.
To simulate a higher share of intermittent generation, the price volatility
in the balancing market was increased. This lead to a further increase in
income in both cases, though the effects were greater with the Nordic prices.
Regardless, these findings underline the need to include balancing markets
in production planning.
While the benefits of including the balancing market in the production
planning are clear, it is important to be aware of the added risk of doing
so. A safety-first strategy was applied to examine how the risk could be
reduced. The result showed that the risk could be reduced from approxi-
mately a 21.5% chance of a 20 000 e loss to a 8.7% of a 1 000 e loss by
changing the bidding strategy. The cost of this reduction was a decrease of
2300 e in expected income. The losses are reduced income compared to the
results from including the day-ahead market only. This information gives
the producer valuable decision support.
In addition to the day-ahead and the balancing market, the capacity mar-
ket, RKOM, was implemented. The results indicate that it is not presently
profitable to participate in this market. However, the changes in bidding
strategy that were necessary when RKOM was included were similar to the
changes that were done to reduce risk. This may make a producer willing
to participate even though the expected profits are reduced. Furthermore,
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it may be attractive to participate in the RKOM in the future if the prices
of capacity reservation increase sufficiently.
A consequence of the model being a prototype that is not fully developed
is that certain implementations need tuning. Problems related to reservoir
behavior and spillage emerged in early simulations. Several improvements
were done to solve these, including new restrictions on spillage and the
introduction of penalty functions to handle reservoirs. With the penalty
functions included in the model, the behavior of the reservoirs changed as
intended. The large negative change of reservoir level that was observed
in reservoir 7 got reduced. The final results also showed that the spillage
restrictions worked as intended.
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There are aspects of the optimization model than can be further investi-
gated to improve the validity and application of the results. The most no-
table improvement potential is the price scenario generation, as this model
input has a great impact on the result. In reality, a hydro power producer
spends a large amount of resources when generating price forecasts because
it is critical to have accurate forecasts when planning future power produc-
tion. These forecasts are often confidential and were therefore not possible
to acquire. Running the model with comprehensive future price forecasts
would be valuable to validate the findings in this thesis.
With the German market prices introduced to the model, the reference price
in ProdRisk was found by scaling the German average day-ahead prices to
equal the Nordic price levels. This means that the water value cuts calcu-
lated in ProdRisk are based on Nordic prices. Although it is not expected to
have a major impact on the result, an improvement is to change the price
input in ProdRisk for the German market case. This will generate more
accurate water value cuts.
The RKOM-H results showed that the capacity market is not presently
very attractive, but this may change in the future. Hence, it is relevant
to extend the RKOM implementation to include RKOM-B. Furthermore,
Nord Pool Spot is regularly implementing new functionality in all markets
that should be implemented in the model.
To achieve a complete model of all the existing markets, one could also
consider to incorporate the intra-day market. This is however not recom-
mended to prioritize because of the following reason. When the model is
run, the producer gets information on how to act on the balancing market
prices. The intra-day market is a continuous market that gives similar trad-
ing opportunities as the balancing market. Therefore, the producer already
has the information needed to make decisions when considering offers in
the intra-day market. The producer only has to consider these offers com-
pared to the chance of getting even better prices in the balancing market.
Therefore, implementing the intra-day market does not necessarily provide
additional decision support.
The results of the simulations suggest that it is profitable to participate in
the balancing market, which means the generator production may change
frequently. The model provides information about the production pattern
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of each generator, however detailed study of this is not performed in this
thesis. It is important to evaluate the consequences the production behav-
ior may have on the machinery, reservoir and rivers. Challenges related to
e.g. sediments, maintenance and river flows might arise. These should be
examined in order to obtain a complete overview of the impacts from the
changes in production planning.
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A Mathematical Model Description
All the determinants are defined systematically in the model by using differ-
ent types depending on what it represents (endre formulering). The sets are
written in CAPIT AL CALLIGRAPHIC letters and parameters in capital
Latin or Greek.
Indexes and decision variables are written in lower case Latin, except bi-
nary variables, which are written in lower case Greek letters. Subscript is
used for indexes, while superscript is used to describe the type of variable
or parameter. The superscript on sets indicated that they are subsets or
a part of a larger set. Parameters marked with an over- or underline are
upper and lower limits, respectively.
Set
S Scenarios
M Scenario tree stages
N Scenario tree nodes
Nm Nodes within stage m in M
Sn Scenarios going through node n in N
T Operational time periods
T M Market periods
T A = T ∪ T M All periods
R Reservoirs
RDr , RSr , RBr Reservoirs who’s discharge, spillage and bypass flow into r
T Drˆt , T Srˆt , T Brˆt Time periods when water is discharged, spilled or bypassed
from reservoir rˆ to arrive downstream at t
J Water value cuts
Gr Generators connected to reservoir r in R
G All generator sets combined (G = ∪r∈RGr)
I Line segments on the PQ-curve
K Thermal generators
BDA, BBM Break points/segments in day-ahead and balancing
market bid curve
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A MATHEMATICAL MODEL DESCRIPTION
Indexes
s Scenario in S
t/tˆ Time period in T A
r/rˆ Reservoir in R
j Water value cut in J
g Hydro power generator in G
i Segment in I
k Thermal generator in K
b Break point/segment in BDA or BBM
Parameters
Tmax Number of operational time periods (normally 24)
TL Length of the time periods (normally 1 hour)
Ps Probability of scenario s in S
QRrt, Q
U
rt Regulated and unregulated inflow
Q
V
r , Q
V
r
Upper and lower reservoir level
Q
∆V
r , Q
∆V
r
Upward and downward reservoir ramping limits
as percent of capacity
Q
R
r , Q
R
r
Maximum and minimum release
Q
B
r , Q
B
r
Maximum and minimum bypass
Q
∆D
r , Q
∆D
r
Upward and downward discharge ramping limits
Q
S
r Spillage cost limit
CSpillr Marginal cost of spillage above the spillage cost limit
TD,Lagrˆ , T
S,Lag
rˆ , T
B,Lag
rˆ Time it takes for discharge, spillage and bypass
flows from reservoir rˆ to end up in downstream
reservoir (description in 3.9)
A-2
QD
g
Mimimum total discharge for each generator
Q
D
gi Maximum discharge for each line segment
CStartg Generator start up cost
EStartgi Power per unit discharge at line segment i
W g, W g Maximum and minimum hydro power production,
respectively
W
Tot
Maximum total hydro power production
QVr,j Reservoir level at cut j as percent of total capacity
Uj Total water value at reservoir levels given by Q
V
r,j
Πrj Slope of water value for change in reservoir level r at cut j
CTk Operation cost of thermal generator k per time period
W
T
k , W
T
k Maximum and minimum thermal production
P˜DAts Day-ahead market price
P
DA
t , P
DA
t Upper and lower bid limit for the day-ahead market
PDA+ts , P
DA−
ts Price points in supply and demand bid curve for
the day-ahead market
P˜BMts Balancing market price
P
BM
ts , P
BM
ts Upper and lower bid limit for the balancing market
PBM+ts , P
BM−
ts Price points in supply and demand bid curve for
the balancing market
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Continuous variables
qVrts Reservoir level of r at the end of time period t
qRrts Released water from r in time period t
qSrts Spillage from r in time period t
qBrts Bypass from r in time period t
qV+rs The sum of discharge, bypass and spillage that will arrive
in reservoir r after the the end of the planning horizon
cSpillrts Spillage cost for spillage from r in time period r
us Water value of final reservoir levels
qDgts Discharge through g in time period t
qDgits Discharge in segment i for generator g in time period t
wgts Hydro power production from generator g
cStartgts Start up cost for generator g
wkts Thermal production from generator k
wDumpts Produced energy that is not being sold. Dump variable
to avoid infeasebility
xDA+bts , x
DA−
bts Supply and demand volume in day-ahead market at
break point b
yDA+ts , y
DA−
ts Accepted supply and demand volume in day-ahead
market
xBM+bts , x
BM−
bts Supply and demand volume in balancing market at
break point b
yBM+ts , y
BM−
ts Accepted supply and demand volume in balancing
market
yIB+ts , y
IB−
ts Positive and negative imbalance volume
Binary variables
γgts Generator state: spinning = 1 or not spinning = 0
General notes
In addition to these, many of the variables are given initial values, such
as the reservoir level and different flows. An index of 0 for any variable
indicates that it is in fact an initial value given as input parameter.
Some conversion factors might also be needed some places in the model.
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Since these might vary depending on the input data, they are not included
in the description.
Model functions
Objective
Obj =−
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈R
cSpillrts (A.1)
−
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
cStartgts (A.2)
−
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
CThermkts w
T
kts (A.3)
+
∑
s∈S
Ssus (A.4)
+
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
g∈G
CStartg (γgTs − γg0s) (A.5)
+
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
t∈T
P˜DAts (y
DA+
ts − yDA−ts ) (A.6)
+
∑
s∈S
Ss
∑
t∈T
P˜BMts (y
BM+
ts − yBM−ts ) (A.7)
Reservoir mass balance
qVrts = q
V
rt−1s + T
L(QRrts − qRrts − qSrts − qPrts)
+
∑
rˆ∈RDr
∑
tˆ∈T Drˆt
TL
tˆ
qD
rˆtˆs
+
∑
rˆ∈RSr
∑
tˆ∈T Srˆt
TL
tˆ
qS
rˆtˆs
+
∑
rˆ∈RBr
∑
tˆ∈T Brˆt
TL
tˆ
qB
rˆtˆs
+
∑
rˆ∈RPr
∑
tˆ∈T Prˆt
TL
tˆ
qP
rˆtˆs
, r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.8)
Mass balance between reservoir and generation∑
g∈G
qDgts = q
R
rts − qBrts +QUrts , r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.9)
Water value cuts
us −
∑
r∈R
Πrj(q
V
rTmaxs + q
V+
rs −Qrj) ≤ Uj − U0 (A.10)
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End flow between reservoirs
qV+rs =
∑
r∈RDr
T∑
t=T−TD,Lagrˆ +1
TLt q
D
rˆts +
∑
r∈RSr
T∑
t=T−TS,Lagrˆ +1
TLt q
S
rˆts
+
∑
r∈RBr
T∑
t=T−TB,Lagrˆ +1
TLt q
B
rˆts, r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.11)
Ramping and discharge limits
−TLQ∆V
r
Q
V
r ≤ qVrts − qVrt−1s ≤ −TLQ
∆V
r Q
V
r , r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.12)
−TLQ∆D
r
≤ qDrts − qDrt−1s ≤ −TLQ
∆D
r , r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.13)
Spillage cost
cSpillrts ≥ CSpillrts (qSrts −Q
S
r ), r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.14)
Power generated on each line segment in the PQ-curve
wgts =
∑
i∈Ig
Eg,i ∗ qDgits, g ∈ G, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.15)
Aggregated discharge across all line segments
qDgts =
∑
i∈Ig
qDgits, g ∈ G, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.16)
Maximum release and bypass
qRgts ≤ Q
R
g (A.17)
qBgts ≤ Q
B
g (A.18)
Minimum release and bypass
qRgts ≥ QRg (A.19)
qBgts ≥ QBg (A.20)
Minimum discharge and production if spinning
qDgts ≥ QDg ∗ γgts (A.21)
wgts ≥W g ∗ γgts (A.22)
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Maximum discharge and production if spinning (0 if not spinning)
qDgts ≤ Q
D
g ∗ γgts (A.23)
Start up cost
cStartgts ≥ CStartg (γgts − γgt−1s), r ∈ R, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.24)
Energy balance between production and market volumes∑
g∈G
wgts
∑
k∈K
wkts−wDumpt,s =
yDA+ts − yDA−ts + yBM+ts
− yBM−ts + yIB+ts − yIB−ts , t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.25)
Total activated supply in the day-ahead market
yDA+ts =
P˜DAts − PDA+bt
PDA+b+1t − PDA+bt
xDA+b+1ts +
PDA+b+1t − P˜DAts
PDA+b+1t − PDA+bt
xDA+bts
, if PDA+bt ≤ P˜DAts ≤ PDA+b+1t , b = 1, ..., BDA − 1, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.26)
Total activated demand in the day-ahead market
yDA−ts =
P˜DAts − PDA−b−1t
PDA−bt − PDA−b−1t
xDA−b+1ts +
PDA−bt − P˜DAts
PDA−bt − PDA−b−1t
xDA−bts
, if PDA−bt ≤ P˜DAts ≤ PDA−b−1t , b = 2, ..., BDA, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.27)
Bid curve monotonicity day-ahead market
xDA+bts ≤ xDA+b+1ts, b = 1, ..., BDA − 1, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.28)
xDA+b−1ts ≤ xDA+bts , b = 2, ..., BDA, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.29)
Total activated supply in the balancing market
yBM+ts =
{
xBM+bts : P
BM+
bts ≤ P˜BMts < PBM+b+1ts
∧
P˜DAts ≤ P˜BMts
0 : P˜DAts > P˜
BM
ts
, b = 1, ..., BBM − 1, t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.30)
Total activated demand in the balancing market
yBM+ts =
{
xBM+b−1ts : P
BM−
bts ≤ P˜BMts < PBM−b−1ts
∧
P˜DAts ≥ P˜BMts
0 : P˜DAts < P˜
BM
ts
, b = 2, ..., BBM , t ∈ T , s ∈ S
(A.31)
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Bid curve monotonicity balancing market
xBM+bts ≤ xBM+b+1ts , b = 1, ..., BBM − 1, t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.32)
xBM+b−1ts ≤ xBM+bts , b = 2, ..., BBM , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (A.33)
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B Mathematical Description of Penalty Func-
tions
Set
RTar Reservoirs handled by target level and penalty function.
Pr Break points on penalty function.
Parameters
PMaxr Last break point on penalty function.
PTarr Index in Pr of target reservoir level.
QBreakrp Reservoir level at penalty function break point as per cent
of total reservoir capacity.
Crp Slope of the penalty function (absolute value).
CFixrp Fixed part of the penalty functions.
Variables
cPenrs Penalty cost for each reservoir.
cTots Total penalty cost to be subtracted from objective.
Pre calculations
Calculates the fixed part of the penalty functions.
CFixr,PTarr = Cr,PTarr ∗Q
Break
r,PTarr
∗QVr /100 , r ∈ R (B.1)
CFixr,PTarr +1 = −Cr,PTarr +1 ∗
QBreakr,PTarr
∗QVr
100
, r ∈ R (B.2)
CFixrp = C
Fix
r,p−1 +
QBreakr,p−1 ∗Q
V
r
100
∗ (Crp−1 − Crp)
, r ∈ R, p ∈ PTarr + 2..PMaxr
(B.3)
CFixrp = C
Fix
r,p+1 +
QBreakr,p ∗Q
V
r
100
∗ (Crp − Crp+1)
, r ∈ R, p ∈ 1..PTarr − 1
(B.4)
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B MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF PENALTY FUNCTIONS
Model Restrictions
Penalty cost greater or equal to every penalty function at given reservoir
level.
cPenrs ≥ −Crp ∗ qVr,TMax,s + CFixrp , r ∈ R, s ∈ S, p ∈ 1..PTarr (B.5)
cPenrs ≥ Crp ∗ qVr,TMax,s + CFixrp , r ∈ R, s ∈ S, p ∈ PTarr ..PMaxr (B.6)
cTots =
∑
r∈RTar
cPenrs , s ∈ S (B.7)
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C Excel Sheets
Several Excel sheets have been used at different stages of the project work,
either to convert data to appropriate formats or to process output data. This
appendix show a list of these with a short explanation for each. The Excel
sheets are are gathered in the zipped folder ”ExcelSheets OptHydroSched.zip”
that accompanies this report.
PriceStatistics.xlsx
Excel sheet use to perform statistical analyses of historical DA and BM
prices.
ScenariosNordic.xlsx & ScenariosGermany.xlsx
Excel sheet containing all the price scenarios that are used in the different
simulations.
results.xlsx
All results where imported from .txt-files into this sheet and processed to
produce the different tables and figures presented in Section 6. The blank
sheets contain the imported data with no modifications. The colored sheets
contains processed data with cell references to the output data sheets.
PQcurves.xlsx
The PQ-curves are calculated in this sheet. Generator and turbine efficiency
curves were copied into the sheet and the Matlab script in Appendix E was
used to adjust generator efficiency and output power to correspond shaft
power (see Section 5.2.2). Basic Excel functions were then used to calculate
the PQ-curves.
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D RKOM Market Data
Table 15 contains the available market data [25] as of 19.05.2015 for RKOM-
week. There were no trade in RKOM-night. Only weeks with trade in
RKOM-H and/or RKOM-B is shown.
Table 15: RKOM-day market data for 2014/2015 from Statnett. Prices
displayed are per MW/h. A conversion factor of 8.5 NOK/EUR was used.
There were either no trade or no data available for weeks not displayed.
RKOM-H day RKOM-B day
Volume Price Price Volume Price Price
Year Week [MW] [NOK] [EUR] [MW] [NOK] [EUR]
2014 50 30 4.5 0.529 170 4.5 0.529
2014 51 0 0 0 240 4.5 0.529
2015 2 90 5 0.588 393 5 0.588
2015 3 290 15 1.765 344 5 0.588
2015 4 410 50 5.882 466 7.52 0.885
2015 5 415 60 7.059 533 9.02 1.062
2015 6 382 90 10.588 376 9 1.059
2015 7 395 40 4.706 481 8 0.941
2015 8 430 40 4.706 349 8 0.941
2015 9 420 40 4.706 358 7.52 0.885
2015 10 105 5 0.588 127 5 0.588
2015 19 70 9.98 1.174 721 9.98 1.174
2015 21 220 9.9 1.165 492 9.9 1.165
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E Matlab Script for PQ Calculations
1 % Sist redigert: 22.10 kl. 23:45
2
3 function [Done] = CalculatePQcurves(HydroPlant)
4
5 %Read output MW from generator efficiency table
6 GenOut = xlsread('PQcurves.xlsx',HydroPlant,'A4:A11');
7 %Read generator efficiencies from generator efficiency table
8 GenEff = xlsread('PQcurves.xlsx',HydroPlant,'B4:B11');
9 %Read discharge from turbine efficiency table
10 Discharge = xlsread('PQcurves.xlsx',HydroPlant,'A15:A22');
11 %Read turbine efficiencies from turbine efficiency table
12 TurbEff = xlsread('PQcurves.xlsx',HydroPlant,'B15:B22');
13 %Read head
14 Head = xlsread('PQcurves.xlsx',HydroPlant,'B14');
15
16 %Find the size of the turbine efficiency table
17 DisSize = size(Discharge,1);
18 %Initialize the generator input corresponding to each discharge
19 GenInput = zeros(DisSize,1);
20
21 %Calculate the input to the generator for all dicharges
22 for i = 1:DisSize
23 GenInput(i) = 9.81*10ˆ(-3)*TurbEff(i)*Discharge(i)*Head;
24 end
25
26 %Initialize power output and generator efficiency
27 PQ = zeros(8,1);
28 N = zeros(8,1);
29
30 %For all discharge levels, calculate output power
31 %and generator efficiency.
32 for i = 1:DisSize
33 %Iterates through the generator efficiency table to find the
34 %closest match below the ouput power calculated from the
35 %input power
36 j = 1;
37 while (GenInput(i)*GenEff(j)) >= GenOut(j) && j+1 <= DisSize
38 j = j+1;
39 end
40 if j == 1
41 j = j+1;
42 end
43
44 %Initialise the temporary ouput power by setting it equal to
45 %input power times generator efficiency found above
46 TempOut = GenInput(i)*GenEff(j);
47 %Interpolate in the generator efficiency table to find
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48 %corresponding efficiency
49 TempN = GenEff(j-1) + (TempOut-GenOut(j-1))*...
50 (GenEff(j)-GenEff(j-1))/(GenOut(j)-GenOut(j-1));
51
52 %Use temporary efficiency to find new output, interpolate to
53 %find new efficiency, rince and repeat until the difference
54 %between the temporary output and the generator input times
55 %the temporary efficiency is less than 0.000001.
56 while (TempOut - GenInput(i)*TempN) >= 0.000001
57 TempOut = GenInput(i)*TempN;
58 TempN = GenEff(j-1) + (TempOut-GenOut(j-1))*...
59 (GenEff(j)-GenEff(j-1))/(GenOut(j)-GenOut(j-1));
60 end
61 %Save the final temporary output and efficiency to PQ and N
62 PQ(i) = TempOut;
63 N(i) = TempN;
64 end
65
66 %Writes results to excel. The variable "Done" is 1 if writing PQ
67 %was successful, otherwhise 0.
68 xlswrite('PQcurves.xlsx',N,HydroPlant,'D15:D22');
69 Done = xlswrite('PQcurves.xlsx',PQ,HydroPlant,'E15:E22');
70 return;
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F Matlab Script for ProdRisk Price Input
1 %Divides price data from 1996 to 2014 into price sections to be
2 %used in ProdRisk.
3 priceSec = [];
4 for year=1996:2014
5 prices = xlsread('Excelark\DAprices NOK',num2str(year),...
6 'B1:Y364');
7 priceSecTemp = [];
8 for i = 0:7:364-7
9 sec1 = mean(mean([prices(i+1:i+5,9:11),...
10 prices(i+1:i+5,15:17)]));
11 sec2 = mean(mean([prices(i+1:i+5,6:8),...
12 prices(i+1:i+5,12:14)]));
13 sec3 = mean(mean([prices(i+1:i+5,1:5),...
14 prices(i+1:i+5,18:22)]));
15 sec4 = mean([mean(prices(i+1:i+5,23:24)),...
16 mean(prices(i+6:i+7,:))]);
17 priceSecTemp = [priceSecTemp;sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4];
18 end
19 priceSec = [priceSec;priceSecTemp'];
20 end
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G Matlab Script for Statistical Analysis of
Prices
1 % Function to run statistics on historical prices.
2 % Input is a 3-column matrix, A, with DA and BM prices in column
3 % 1 and 2 and the difference between them in column 3. Title is
4 % the name of the data series.
5 function diffCount = Statistics(A,Title)
6 pngPrint = 1;
7 c = size(A,1);
8 minDiff = floor(min(A(:,3)));
9 maxDiff = ceil(max(A(:,3)));
10
11 %Plots histogram of DA-RK price differences.
12 histFig = figure('Name',[Title,': Number of occurences',...
13 'for intervals of DA-RK price difference']);
14 set(histFig, 'Visible', 'off');
15 hist(A(:,3),2*(maxDiff-minDiff));
16
17 savefig(['Figures\',Title,'Hist']);
18 % Finds the number of occurencies of each DA-RK price
19 % difference, rounded to the nearest integer. Previousely
20 % used to make histogram plot. May multiply values to
21 % split into more intervals.
22 diffCount = zeros(maxDiff-minDiff+1,1);
23 for i = 1:c
24 k = round(A(i,3))-minDiff+1;
25 diffCount(k) = diffCount(k)+1;
26 end
27
28 % Counts the number of up, down and no regulation for 6
29 % intervals around the mean value for the whole price period.
30 % Used to check if there is any correlation between DA price
31 % and DA-RK price difference.
32 stdAvvik = std(A(:,1));
33 middelverdi = mean(A(:,1));
34 DAdiffCheck = zeros(6,6);
35 for i = 1:c
36 if A(i,1) < middelverdi - 2*stdAvvik
37 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
38 DAdiffCheck(1,2) = DAdiffCheck(1,2)+1;
39 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
40 DAdiffCheck(1,1) = DAdiffCheck(1,1)+1;
41 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
42 DAdiffCheck(1,3) = DAdiffCheck(1,3)+1;
43 end
44 elseif A(i,1) < middelverdi - stdAvvik
45 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
46 DAdiffCheck(2,2) = DAdiffCheck(2,2)+1;
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47 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
48 DAdiffCheck(2,1) = DAdiffCheck(2,1)+1;
49 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
50 DAdiffCheck(2,3) = DAdiffCheck(2,3)+1;
51 end
52 elseif A(i,1) < middelverdi
53 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
54 DAdiffCheck(3,2) = DAdiffCheck(3,2)+1;
55 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
56 DAdiffCheck(3,1) = DAdiffCheck(3,1)+1;
57 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
58 DAdiffCheck(3,3) = DAdiffCheck(3,3)+1;
59 end
60 elseif A(i,1) < middelverdi + stdAvvik
61 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
62 DAdiffCheck(4,2) = DAdiffCheck(4,2)+1;
63 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
64 DAdiffCheck(4,1) = DAdiffCheck(4,1)+1;
65 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
66 DAdiffCheck(4,3) = DAdiffCheck(4,3)+1;
67 end
68 elseif A(i,1) < middelverdi + 2*stdAvvik
69 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
70 DAdiffCheck(5,2) = DAdiffCheck(5,2)+1;
71 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
72 DAdiffCheck(5,1) = DAdiffCheck(5,1)+1;
73 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
74 DAdiffCheck(5,3) = DAdiffCheck(5,3)+1;
75 end
76 elseif A(i,1) >= middelverdi + 2*stdAvvik
77 if A(i,1) == A(i,2)
78 DAdiffCheck(6,2) = DAdiffCheck(6,2)+1;
79 elseif A(i,1) < A(i,2)
80 DAdiffCheck(6,1) = DAdiffCheck(6,1)+1;
81 elseif A(i,1) > A(i,2)
82 DAdiffCheck(6,3) = DAdiffCheck(6,3)+1;
83 end
84 end
85 end
86 % Converts above numbers to percentages.
87 for i = 1:6
88 for j = 1:3
89 DAdiffCheck(i,j+3) =...
90 100*DAdiffCheck(i,j)/sum(DAdiffCheck(i,1:3));
91 end
92 end
93
94 % Counts the number of hours with up, down and no regulation
95 % for each day and calculates the average DA price for that
96 % day. Used to make scatter plot to check for correlation
97 % with DA price and DA-RK price difference.
98 dayCount = zeros(c/24,4);
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99 for i = 1:24:c
100 for j = 0:23
101 if A(i+j,3) == 0
102 dayCount((i+23)/24,3) = dayCount((i+23)/24,3)+1;
103 elseif A(i+j,3) < 0
104 dayCount((i+23)/24,2) = dayCount((i+23)/24,2)+1;
105 elseif A(i+j,3) > 0
106 dayCount((i+23)/24,4) = dayCount((i+23)/24,4)+1;
107 end
108 end
109 dayCount((i+23)/24,1) = mean(A(i:i+23,1));
110 end
111 scatterDown = figure('Name',[Title,...
112 ': Number of down-regulations at each price level']);
113 set(scatterDown,'Visible','off');
114 hold on;
115 title('Number of down-regulations at each price level',...
116 'FontSize',20);
117 xlabel('Average daily DA-price [EUR/MWh]','FontSize',16);
118 ylabel('Number of down-reguations','FontSize',16);
119 scatter(dayCount(:,1),dayCount(:,2));
120 savefig(['Figures\',Title,'ScatterDW']);
121
122 scatterNo = figure('Name',[Title,...
123 ': Number of no regulation at each price level']);
124 set(scatterNo,'Visible','off');
125 hold on;
126 title('Number of no regulation at each price level',...
127 'FontSize',20);
128 xlabel('Average daily DA-price [EUR/MWh]', 'FontSize',16);
129 ylabel('Number of no reguation','FontSize',16);
130 scatter(dayCount(:,1),dayCount(:,3));
131 savefig(['Figures\',Title,'ScatterNO']);
132
133 scatterUp = figure('Name',[Title,...
134 ': Number of up regulations at each price level']);
135 set(scatterUp,'Visible','off');
136 hold on;
137 title('Number of up-regulations at each price level',...
138 'FontSize',20);
139 xlabel('Average daily DA-price [EUR/MWh]','FontSize',16);
140 ylabel('Number of up-reguations','FontSize',16);
141 scatter(dayCount(:,1),dayCount(:,4));
142 savefig(['Figures\',Title,'ScatterUP']);
143
144 if pngPrint == 1
145 saveas(scatterDown,['Figures\',Title,'ScatterDW'],'png');
146 saveas(scatterNo,['Figures\',Title,'ScatterNO'],'png');
147 saveas(scatterUp,['Figures\',Title,'ScatterUP'],'png');
148 end
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H Scatter Plots for Regulation Trend Analy-
sis
Figure H.1: Number of up-regulations each day as function of average DA
price the respective day, week 18-39.
Figure H.2: Number of down-regulations each day as function of average
DA price the respective day, week 18-39.
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Figure H.3: Number of up-regulations each day as function of average DA
price the respective day, week 40-52.
Figure H.4: Number of down-regulations each day as function of average
DA price the respective day, week 40-52.
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